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Abstract
The first chapter of my dissertation characterizes how the strategic choices of product variety, quality and
pricing by a brick and mortar store evolve in the face of stiffening competition from online retailers in the
market. For many consumers, online purchases are imperfect substitutes for store purchases due to delayed
delivery, the need for unfamiliar self-installation, etc. As online products become better substitutes and
online competition intensifies, the store moves from socially-efficient provision of product qualities and va-
rieties, to reducing the quality of its low quality products, next, to selective provision of high quality prod-
ucts, before returning to socially-efficient provision of product quality and product varieties. All the while,
the physical store’s profits decline, and it finally exits the market when the internet competition becomes
so stiff that it drives operating profits below its fixed costs of operation. An extension explores outcomes
when the store has an online portal, characterizing when the physical store appears to act as a loss leader.
Chapter 2 analyzes the dynamics of positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elec-
tions, characterizing the strategic considerations that influence campaigning choices. Candidates devote
resources to positive campaigning, which builds their reputation stocks, and to negative campaigning,
which damages a rival’s. An explanation is provided for why general campaigns are more negative than
primary campaigns: in the general election, winning primary candidates benefit only from positive pri-
mary campaigning; and negative campaigning by a primary loser, impairs his party rival’s chances. More
generally, the impact of the (a) relative strengths of candidates (initial resources and reputations), (b) how
much candidates care about winning vs just having their party win, and (c) the campaigning technology
(effectiveness, decay in the effects of primary campaigning before the general election) on the magnitudes
and composition of campaigning in both elections is characterized.
In Chapter 1, consumers are assumed to have either a high or a low valuation of quality. Chapter
3 looks at how outcomes change when consumer valuation types are continuous. A numerical analysis
reveals that there exists a threshold of consumer valuation of quality such that consumers with valuations
below the threshold buy the low quality product while those with valuations above the threshold buy the
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high quality product. As online competition increases, the store initially lowers its prices in order to retain
consumers who would otherwise switch to online purchases and this move initially allows it to attract more
consumers than before. However, the store is unable to match the competitive offers available online for
long; when the spread of consumer valuations is not too low, as online products become better substitutes,
consumers with relatively low valuations increasingly switch to online products. The low quality product
of the store now caters to the tastes of consumers with higher valuations than before: the store begins to
increase the quality and price of its low quality products. To prevent its high valuation consumers from
switching over to the low quality product, the store raises the quality of its high quality product too. All
the while, its profits decline and the store eventually exits the market when it is unable to meet its fixed
operating costs. The impact of a smaller spread of consumer valuations, lower marginal costs and higher
travel costs on the strategic choices of the brick and mortar store is also explored.
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To Ma Baba, to whom I owe everything.
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Chapter 1
Quality Provision and Pricing
in the Face of Online Competition
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a dramatic surge in online shopping as the ease and reliability of online purchases
has improved.1 So, too, recent years have seen the exit of many previously-profitable brick and mortar
stores—Circuit City, Eatons, KMart, Linens N Things, Borders Books, Blockbuster Video and so on—in
large part due to intensified online competition.
In this paper, we paint a portrait of a physical store flailing to find a successful strategic plan in
the face of increased online competition. For many consumers, online purchases are imperfect substitutes
for store purchases due to delayed delivery, the need for unfamiliar self-installation, etc. We characterize
how the strategic choices by the physical store of product variety, quality and pricing evolve as online
products become better substitutes and online competition intensifies. As online competition grows, the
physical store appears to abandon one strategic plan for another and then for a third before returning to
its original plan. All the while, the physical store’s profits decline, and it finally exits the market when
the internet competition becomes so stiff that it drives operating profits below its fixed costs of operation.
In our model, consumers are distinguished by (1) their costs of traveling to the brick and mortar store,
(2) their utility loss associated with online purchases, which we capture by a multiplicative discount fac-
tor2, and (3) their preferences for quality. Consumers know their travel costs and the utility/inconvenience
costs incurred from online purchases, but do not learn their product valuations (high or low) unless they
physically inspect products: as in Loginova (2009), online venues do not allow a sufficient hands-on in-
spection to permit consumers to learn their valuations. As a result, consumers may visit a physical store
to learn their quality valuations, and hence which products they want to purchase. However, once at the
1 A 2010 Nielsen survey, Global Trends in Online Shopping, A Nielsen Global Consumer Report (June 2010), found that
84% of consumers shop online, and online shopping accounted for more than 5 percent of total monthly spending for 56
percent of the respondents.
2Qualitative results are unaffected if online purchases instead incur a service cost that enters additively. Such additive
costs only affect the range of goods provided online.
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store, consumers can opt instead to buy online from a competitive e-retailer.3 Given this online compe-
tition, the brick and mortar store chooses (a) the extent of product variety (one quality or two), (b) the
levels of qualities offered, and (c) prices.
As a benchmark, we consider the case where the utility costs from online purchases are prohibitive,
so the physical store is a monopolist. We show that the store provides the socially optimal product quality
for each consumer valuation type, fully internalizing the surplus associated with efficient quality provision.
More subtly, prices are only imperfectly pinned down. Because consumers do not learn their valuations
unless they visit the store, decisions about whether to go to the store to make a purchase only hinge on
the expected price paid. Once at the store, consumers are captured since travel costs are sunk. As a result,
the range of equilibrium prices for the low quality good (and hence the high quality good) is only pinned
down by the ex post individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.
Once the utility costs of online purchases fall by enough, e-retailers operate. We consider populations
of consumers with representative high, medium and low utility costs for online purchases. Low utility cost
consumers are comfortable with online purchases. In equilibrium, they either purchase directly from an
online e-retailer without learning their quality valuation (if located far from the physical store), or they
first visit the physical store (if close) to learn their valuations and then purchase online the product that
they identify for themselves as right. In this way, the physical store provides these consumers a positive
externality, but fails to profit from it. In contrast, online purchases are not a viable alternative for high
utility cost consumers, who buy at the store, if they buy at all.
Our primary focus is on the intermediate population of consumers with medium online discount fac-
tors who may plausibly buy from either source, and on what happens as online purchases become more
attractive. As long as the value of this medium online discount factor remains low enough, the physical
store continues to provide socially optimal product qualities, although the set of possible equilibrium price
combinations shrinks once online competition limits the extent to which it can set a high price for a quality.
Once online discount factors rise by enough to make online purchases a viable alternative for consumers
who want to buy at the outset without learning their valuations, the physical store’s profits begin to fall,
even though, at first it continues to provide socially optimal qualities, albeit at lower prices.
Online competition is more intense for products that appeal to low valuation consumers, as their
3A recent research survey revealed that 45 percent of customers shopping at brick and mortar locations will walk out and
complete their purchase online for a discount as low as 2.5 percent. For a 5 percent savings, the survey showed 60 percent
would leave to shop online. Labeled as “showrooming”, this shopping trend is driven by the ease with which consumers now
access information on prices online via mobile phones. [‘Showrooming’ shopping poses challenges for retailers, BusinessNews
Daily]
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utility loss from online purchases is less. Hence, the prices of lower quality products are more sensitive
to online competition. In the interesting case where quality valuations do not differ vastly for different
consumer types—so that consumers can be reasonably uncertain about which product is best for them—as
online discount factors rise, eventually the decline in the price of the low quality good makes it attractive
to high valuation consumers.
Now, as online discount factors rise further, the physical store appears to experiment with its strate-
gic plan. First, in the face of its own product-line competition, it distorts the quality targeted at low
valuation consumers downward as long as quality valuation differences are small enough. Next, provided
enough consumers have high valuations, the own product-line competition from its low quality product for
its high quality product becomes severe enough that the store does away with the lower quality product,
switching to specializing in the provision of the high quality product.
This phase does not last. As online products become ever better substitutes, eventually direct on-
line competition of high quality products begins to bite. Once the internet provides sufficiently good,
competitively-priced high quality products, the physical store need no longer worry about own product-
line competition—high valuation consumers are no longer attracted to lower quality in-store products,
preferring higher quality online products, instead. In turn, this induces the physical store to return to its
original strategic plan of providing a full range of product qualities, offering once more the socially optimal
quality levels, and prices that just induce consumers with medium online discount factors to purchase from
it. All the while its profits decrease and in the final stage, the physical store goes bankrupt and exits, as
these prices fail to cover the fixed costs of its brick and mortar presence.
This process of repeated “experimentation” with different strategic plans—from reduced prices of a
broad array of (socially optimal) qualities, to experiments with reduced low quality products, which are
then dropped completely, before a return to an original plan of a broad array of socially optimal quali-
ties sold at low prices, and then finally bankruptcy—together with ever-dropping prices and profits has
the appearance of a physical store making strategic error after error, floundering in the face of stiffening
online competition. In fact, the store always acts optimally, but it is unable to capitalize on the positive
externalities it provides consumers who exploit the information conveyed by hands-on inspection, but then
either shop elsewhere, or demand punishingly low prices to stay.
We then extend the model to explore the case where the physical store also has an online portal. We
seek to capture the phenomena that physical stores often provide product installation support or servicing
facilities that some consumers derive value from when buying at its online portal. Maintaining an online
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portal can benefit the store when diverting sales to its online outlet provides cost savings. Indeed, the
store survives even if its physical store’s sales cannot cover its fixed costs of operation by drawing on its
profitable online sales—its online outlet appears to profit from prices that are “less competitive” than
those of other online e-tailers, with the physical store appearing to act as a loss leader. However, it is only
the physical store’s presence that allows its online portal to generate profits.
Related literature. Our paper builds on work dating back to Mussa and Rosen (1978), Goldman et al.
(1980), Spence (1980), and Maskin and Riley (1984) that explores price discrimination via quantity dis-
counts and pricing of products of different qualities by monopolists facing heterogeneous consumers with
different private valuations. In these models, in contrast to our benchmark setting, quality is distored
downward for all but those with the highest willingness to pay, because downward incentive compatibility
constraints bind. Rochet and Stole (1997) study duopoly nonlinear pricing in a model with horizontal and
vertical product differentiation. When the degree of horizontal differentiation is so large that each firm is a
local monopolist, perfect sorting arises, with quality distortions for all types but at the top and the bottom.
In contrast, with little horizontal differentiation, the market is fully covered on both vertical and horizontal
dimensions, and firms offer a cost-plus-fee pricing schedule with efficient quality provision. A more general
analysis in Rochet and Stole (2002) covers both monopoly and duopoly, and allows for general distributions.
The most closely-related paper is Loginova (2009). She models competition between electronic retail-
ers and brick and mortar stores that sell a homogeneous product to consumers with heterogeneous valua-
tions (high or low) who only learn their valuations after visiting the store. Paradoxically, the presence of
electronic retailers causes brick and mortar stores to raise prices. Rather than compete for low valuation
consumers against e-retailers, stores target only high valuation consumers, whose demands are less price
elastic. Low valuation consumers return home and buy online. Our paper extends the analysis by studying
quality provision and pricing by stores and how they evolve in the face of increasing online competition.
The idea that consumers must learn by visiting a store also appears in the price search literature that
dates back to Stahl (1979), and continues on in research such as Ellison’s (2005) model of add-on pricing
in which firms advertise a base price for a product and try to induce customers with a high willingness to
pay to buy high-priced add-ons at the point of sale.
There is a burgeoning literature on consumer and firm behavior in online environments. Alba et al
(1997), Danaher et al. (2003), Peterson et al. (1997), and Ratchford et al. (2001) conduct empirical anal-
yses of the differences between online and offline purchase experiences, focusing on assessing the impact
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of prices, brand names and product attributes on consumer choice. These indicate that online shopping is
well suited for functional products about which online stores can provide detailed information. However,
online stores are less suited for products with sensory “touch and feel” attributes. Brown and Goolsbee
(2002) use data on individual insurance policies to analyze the impact of comparison shopping on offline
prices. They find that the introduction of the insurance-oriented web sites was at first associated with high
price dispersion. As the use of these sites became more widespread, prices and dispersion fall. Sengupta
and Wiggins (2006) find that increased online sales of airline tickets are associated with reduced online
and offline prices. Lal and Sarvary (1999) distinguish between digital and non-digital product attributes.
Digital attributes can be conveyed via the internet, while non-digital attributes can only be judged in per-
son at a retail store. The introduction of online shopping may induce consumers not to search, but instead
to order familiar products online. In turn, this increased consumer loyalty can induce firms to raise prices.
The paper is structured as follows. We next present the formal model. In Section 1.3, we study the
case where the brick and mortar store exists as a monopoly and offers multiple qualities of the product.
Section 1.4 analyzes our central internet setting where both e-retailers and stores operate in the market.
Section 1.5 explores how outcomes are affected when the brick and mortar store also operates an online
portal. Proofs are collected in Appendix A.
1.2 The Model
Our economy features a single brick and mortar (b&m) store that has a physical establishment, and many
competitive electronic retailers that sell products on the internet. These stores differ in three ways: (1) it
is costly for consumers to travel to the b&m store, but internet “transportation” costs are zero; (2) online
purchases are imperfect and inferior substitutes for purchases from the b&m store reflecting that online
deliveries take time and may require inconvenient and possibly flawed self-installation; and (3) there is a
fixed cost k > 0 of having a physical establishment, but maintaining an internet presence is costless.
There is a measure one of consumers. Consumers differ from each other in three ways: (1) their
distances x from the b&m store; (2) their valuations θ ∈ {θl, θh} of product quality; and (3) their online
utility discount factors, δ ∈ {0, δm, 1}, where δ describes how good a substitute online purchases are for
purchases at a b&m store. Consumer location, quality valuation and utility costs from online purchases
are independently distributed in the population.
In the population of consumers, travel distances to the physical store are uniformly distributed on
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[0, 0.5]. A consumer who travels distance x to the b&m store incurs costs tx, where t > 0. A consumer
with quality valuation θ and online discount factor δ derives utility θq− 12q2 from purchasing a product of
quality q from the b&m store, but he only derives utility δ(θq− 12q2), if he buys online. Fraction λ of con-
sumers value quality at a high level, θh; the remaining consumers only value quality by θl < θh. Fraction
µ0 of consumers have prohibitively high utility losses from online purchases (δ = 0), while fraction µ1 of
consumers are patient, and facile at self-installation (δ = 1). The remaining measure µm = 1− µ0 − µ1 of
consumers incur intermediate utility losses from online purchases (δ = δm). Thus, type δ = 0 consumers
never purchase online, while type δ = 1 consumers always purchase online as long as e-retailers offer lower
prices than the physical store. It is only type δm consumers who are potentially open to purchasing both
online or at the b&m store.
A consumer knows his distance x from the b&m store, and the utility costs associated with his on-
line purchases, but he does not learn his valuation of quality unless he goes to a store and inspects the
products. A consumer can (1) buy a product online at the outset without knowing his valuation, or (2)
visit a store, learn his valuation, and then decide which product, if any, to buy at the b&m store or online.
Firms know the distribution of (x, δ, θ) in the economy, but do not observe these attributes in consumers.
It costs cq to produce a good of quality q, where c > 0. The b&m store chooses the level and variety
of its product qualities, and their prices. We are interested in the setting where a consumer’s possible
valuations of quality, θl and θh, are not too different so that a consumer could plausibly be uncertain
about his or her valuations. As a result, θl >> max{c, θh − c}. Accordingly, it is socially efficient for the
b&m store to provide quality q∗i = θi− c to a consumer with quality valuation θi. The fact that θh and θl
do not differ too substantially means that if the b&m store sells both qualities q∗h and q∗l , then it has to
concern itself about the possibility that a high quality valuation customer may buy the low quality good
whenever the price difference ph− pl is large. That is, the b&m store has to worry about the competition
provided by its own product quality line. Electronic retailers are perfectly competitive, implying that a
consumer can buy online a good of any quality q at a price of cq.
1.2.1 Monopoly
We first consider a benchmark setting where µ0 = 1, so that online purchases are not a viable alternative
for consumers, making the b&m store a monopolist. When the b&m store sells two product qualities ql
and qh, ql < qh at associated prices pl < ph, the expected utility of a consumer who visits the b&m store,
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inspects the products and decides which, if any, to buy is
λmax
(
θhqh − 12q
2
h − ph, θhql −
1
2q
2
l − pl, 0
)
+ (1− λ) max(θlqh − 12q2h − ph, θlql − 12q2l − pl, 0)− tx.
Because type θh consumers value quality by more than type θl consumers, product quality choices rise in
θ. For type θh consumers to purchase qh and type θl consumers to purchase ql, the following incentive
compatibility constraints must hold:
θh(qh − ql)− 12(q
2
h − q2l ) ≥ (ph − pl)
θl(qh − ql)− 12(q
2
h − q2l ) ≤ (ph − pl).
Further, the individual rationality constraint for low valuation types, θlql − 12q2l − pl ≥ 0, must hold for
type θl consumers to purchase at the store. The expected utility that a consumer located at x expects to
derive from visiting the b&m store, prior to learning his valuation is
λ(θhqh − 12q
2
h − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
1
2q
2
l − pl)− tx,
implying that the b&m store draws consumers over a distance
x = λ
t
(
θhqh − 12q
2
h − ph
)
+
(1− λ
t
)(
θlql − 12q
2
l − pl
)
.
The b&m store’s expected profits, under monopoly, are
piM =
[2λ
t
(
θhqh − 12q
2
h − ph
)
+ 2(1− λ)
t
(
θlql − 12q
2
l − pl
)](
λ(ph − cqh) + (1− λ)(pl − cql)
)− k.
Proposition 1 characterizes the associated equilibria. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose the b&m store is a monopolist. Then, in equilibrium,
1. The b&m store always provides the socially efficient levels of quality, θj − c, j = h, l.
2. There exists a continuum of supporting equilibrium prices, {pl, ph(pl)} indexed by pl ∈ [pl, p¯l] that
induce the same participation decisions by consumers of whether to visit the b&m store and buy a
product, and deliver the same expected profits to the monopolist.
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3. For pl ∈ (pl, p¯l), all incentive constraints hold as strict inequalities.
Figure 1.1: Continuum of equilibrium price offers when λ is relatively low and high
Figure 1.1 depicts the continuum of supporting equilibrium prices. The pricing equivalence result
reflects that when consumers are deciding whether to travel to the b&m store, they do not know whether
their valuations are high or low. As a result, only the expected price enters their calculations. Thus, con-
sumers are indifferent to increases in the price of the high quality good when accompanied by a suitable
decrease in the price of the low quality good (so that λdph + (1 − λ)dpl = 0). Once at the b&m store,
everyone purchases a product, as incentive constraints are slack.4 At pl, the incentive compatibility con-
straint for the high valuation type holds at equality. Whether the upper bound on pl is determined by the
incentive compatibility constraint for the low valuation consumer or his individual rationality constraint
depends on how differently consumers may value quality. Fixing θl, there exists a ρ(λ, c) such that if the
types are sufficiently close in quality, θh − θl ≤ ρ(λ, c), the incentive compatibility constraint holds at
p¯l; and if the types are less close, θh − θl > ρ(λ, c), the individual rationality constraint holds. Further,
ρ(λ, c) decreases in the fraction λ of consumers with high valuations. Our premise that consumers are
uncertain about their valuations suggests that the relevant case is that where the products are relatively
close substitutes, i.e., the incentive compatibility constraint becomes the relevant constraint.
The result that it is optimal for the b&m store to provide the socially efficient level of quality to each
valuation type reflects the ex-post slackness of the incentive constraints. Therefore, the b&m store can
extract all surplus associated with quality provision.
4Perturbing the economy, for example, by having a vanishingly small but positive measure of consumers who know their
valuation, ex ante, will deliver a unique equilibrium pricing outcome (here, it would be the price combination pair in the
set of equilibrium price offers that maximizes profits from these consumers).
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1.2.2 Internet Competition
We now assume that online purchases are plausible alternatives for some consumers, i.e., µm and µ1 are
strictly positive, so that electronic retailers operate. We focus on the interesting case where µ0 is not so
high that the b&m store only wants to serve consumers for whom the internet is not an option (as then
the monopoly product provision and pricing obtains).
A consumer located distance x from the b&m store can buy online at the outset without knowing his
quality valuation, or he can visit the b&m store where he learns his valuation. Once he has learnt his valu-
ation, he can opt to buy a product at the b&m store, or return and buy it online, if at all. If he buys online
at the outset, marginal cost pricing on the part of electronic retailers implies that his quality choice solves
max
q
δλ
(
θhq − 12q
2
)
+ (1− λ)δ
(
θlq − 12q
2
)
− cq.
Hence, he purchases online a good of quality
q = δE[θ]− c
δ
,
provided that δ ≥ cE[θ] , obtaining an expected payoff of (δE[θ] − c)2/2δ. A consumer who buys online
after learning θ purchases a good of quality
q(θ) = δθ − c
δ
,
provided that δ ≥ cθ , obtaining a payoff of (δθ − c)2/2δ. Consumers with δ = 0 never buy online. Con-
sumers with δ = δm may or may not derive a positive payoff from purchasing online. For instance, if
δm ∈
(
c
θh
, cE[θ]
)
, a consumer would buy online if he learns that his valuation is high, but not at the outset
or if he is a low type.
We omit the analysis of patient, computer-savvy consumers with δ = 1 who are skilled at self-
installation. Since the b&m store always prices above marginal cost, these consumers always make any
purchases online. Only consumers with online discount factors δ ∈ {0, δm} ever buy at the store. As
before, individual rationality constraints imply that the maximum distances traveled by consumers with
δ = 0 and δ = δm are
x∗0 =
1
t
(
θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph
)
+ (1− λ)
(
θlql − q
2
l
2 − pl
)
9
and
x∗m =
λ
t
(
θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph
)
+
(1− λ
t
)(
θlql − q
2
l
2 − pl
)
−
(
1δm> cE[θ]
(δmE[θ]− c)2
2tδm
)
.
Hence, the b&m store’s profits are
piI =
2
t
(
(µ0 + µm)
(
λ(θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
q2l
2 − pl)
)
− µm1δm> cE[θ]
(δmE[θ]− c)2
2δm
)
× (λ(ph − cqh) + (1− λ)(pl − cql))− k. (1.1)
Thus, the b&m store’s maximization problem becomes:
max piI subject to
ICh : θh(qh − ql)− 12(q
2
h − q2l )− (ph − pl) ≥ 0
ICl : θl(qh − ql)− 12(q
2
h − q2l )− (ph − pl) ≤ 0
IRh : θhqh − 12q
2
h − ph ≥ 1δm> cθh
(δmθh − c)2
2δm
IRl : θlql − 12q
2
l − pl ≥ 1δm> cθl
(δmθl − c)2
2δm
.
We begin by characterizing equilibrium outcomes when internet options represent poor substitutes
for in-store purchases for consumers with medium online discount factors.
Proposition 2. Fixing other parameters, there exists a δm(θl) ∈ [ cθl , 1] such that
1. For δm < δm, in equilibrium, the b&m store provides the unconstrained optimal levels of qual-
ity, θj − c, j = h, l, with supporting prices p∗l ∈ [pl(δm), p¯l(δm)] and p∗h = h(p∗l ), h′ < 0, where
p¯l(δm)−pl(δm) is strictly decreasing in δm once δm is sufficiently large. For all p∗l ∈ (pl(δm), p¯l(δm))
all incentive constraints hold as strict inequalities.
2. There exists a δ∗m < δm such that for δm ≤ δ∗m, the b&m store’s profits are fraction µ0 +µm of their
monopoly level. Once δm > δ∗m, its profits decline monotonically in δm.
3. At δm, the individual rationality constraints hold at equality if valuations are sufficiently different,
i.e., θl < θ¯l(θh); but if θl > θ¯l(θh) the individual rationality constraint for the low type and the
incentive compatibility constraint for the high type hold at equality.
The intuition is clean. When δm is low, the competitive pressure exerted by online stores is minimal.
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Consequently, as when the b&m store is a monopolist, quality provision is efficient and its profits are a
fraction µ0 + µm of monopoly profits (consumers with δ = 1 buy online). As δm increases further, online
purchases become viable alternatives for consumers at the outset, and at even higher discount factors,
after realizations of low quality valuations. As a result, the b&m store’s profits begin to fall with increases
in δm as improved online alternatives curtail its ability to charge high prices. Still, the incentive com-
patibility constraints do not bind, implying efficient quality provision is optimal. The intuition reflects
the fact that the exante incentives of consumers to visit the b&m store as well as the b&m store’s profits
from a representative consumer remain unchanged if the price of the high quality good is lowered and that
of the low quality good is raised in a manner such that λdph + (1 − λ)dpl = 0, while keeping qualities,
q∗h = θh − c, q∗l = θl − c, unchanged. At δm, multiple constraints hold at equality—the individual ratio-
nality constraint for the low valuation type, and one of the high valuation consumer’s constraints, where
it is incentive compatibility constraint that holds if and only if consumer valuations of quality are not too
different. Hence, supporting equilibrium prices are unique.
The next proposition provides our key characterization result. It describes the b&m store’s optimal
price quality offers, as δm rises past δm and online goods become increasingly good substitutes for in-store
purchases.
Proposition 3. If consumer quality valuations are sufficiently close, θl > θˆl and enough consumers have
high quality valuations, λ > λ¯(θl), then there exists a range of online discount factors (δˆ1m(θl, λ), δˆ2m(θl))
such that if online purchases are:
• Less good substitutes, δm ∈ (δm, δˆ1m(θl, λ)), then the b&m store sells both product qualities, but
distorts quality provision for the low type below the socially-efficient level.
• Better substitutes, δm ∈ (δˆ1m(θl, λ), δˆ2m(θl)), then the b&m store only sells to consumers with high
valuations of quality.
• Very good substitutes, δm > δˆ2m(θl), then the b&m store offers both product qualities and quality
provision is efficient.
The higher is δm > δm the more attractive are online purchases, especially for low valuation types.
This is because products available online are offered at competitive prices and the utility cost of online
purchases, (1− δm)(θlq − q
2
2 ), for a consumer with a low valuation for quality is less than that for a high
valuation type. Consequently, a smaller price differential between the b&m store’s price and online offers
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is enough to trigger a switch to online purchases for low valuation consumers, once δm is high enough. In
turn, this means that the b&m’s own product-line competition intensifies as online competition rises.
When quality valuations are close, a binding incentive compatibility constraint for the high type
consumers impinges on the b&m store’s ability to extract consumer surplus from high types: charging
too much for the high quality product may induce high valuation consumers to switch to the low quality
product. This is exacerbated by internet competition: once the individual rationality constraint for low
valuation consumers binds, the store must increase the surplus of its low valuation consumers, θlql− q
2
l
2 −pl,
as internet products become better substitutes, else these consumers switch to online purchases. In such
situations, doing away with this product line competition by offering a single product to high valuation
consumers allows the store to charge a high price, albeit at the loss of the business of low valuation
consumers. All in all, this benefits the store as long as enough of its customer base values quality highly.
However, as the online discount factor rises still further, online products become increasingly good
substitutes. As a result, eventually the preferred alternative of high valuation consumers becomes a
slightly discounted high quality online product rather than an undiscounted, inferior in-store product: on-
line competition swamps the store’s product line competition. High valuation consumers now view online
high quality substitutes as more attractive than the store’s low quality product—the incentive compati-
bility constraint for the high valuation consumers becomes slack, and the store reverts to offering efficient
qualities to both valuation types.
This analysis has ignored the fact that the b&m store has fixed costs of operation that its operating
profits must cover for it to survive. As online competition intensifies, certainly as δm → 1 (when µ0 is
small enough), the b&m store will be driven out of the market. The timing of its exit will, of course,
depend on the level of its fixed costs:
Corollary 1. Depending on the level of fixed costs, various exit patterns emerge. The b&m store transits
from an offer of two qualities to none if fixed costs are relatively high; from two qualities to a single one
to none if fixed costs are only moderately large; and from two qualities to one to two to none if fixed costs
are small.
Remark. Even if µ0 is tiny, so there are few computer-illiterate consumers who rely on the b&m store
for purchases, its exit can sharply impair consumer welfare due to the loss of informational externalities:
even computer-savvy consumers value visiting the b&m store in order to freely inspect products, learn
which is best for them, and then purchase accordingly.
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1.3 Online portal
In this section we investigate how outcomes are changed when the b&m store also operates an online por-
tal, and offers technical support that reduces the installation costs that some consumers would otherwise
incur from online purchases. Concretely, we model the phenomena that a consumer can go to Best Buy
or Apple to get computer service help. We model this by assuming that a fraction α of consumers who
would otherwise only receive a discounted online payoff (δm) receive, instead, the full undiscounted utility
payoff if they buy from the b&m’s online portal because they can exploit the physical store’s technical
support. Other independent electronic retailers cannot offer this support to online purchasers.
The b&m store may gain in three ways from its online portal. First, the online portal, like any other
e-retailer, has no fixed costs. Second, together with its portal, the b&m store may be able to capture
the rents associated with providing technical support to consumers. Third, by shifting sales to its online
portal, the b&m store may be able to reduce its physical footprint and hence its costs. We model this
with a slightly more sophisticated cost structure. We assume that the b&m store incurs fixed costs of
production, k and marginal costs, s > 0 of handling consumers who opt to buy at the b&m store, possibly
because it can reduce the size of its expensive store front space. This creates an incentive for the b&m
store to divert its sales to its online outlet. All other aspects of the model remain the same.
Now, of those consumers with δ = δm, a fraction α may buy at the b&m’s online portal, while
the remainder buy at its physical store. Computer savvy consumers buy from an independent electronic
retailer, as they derive no additional utility from the services offered by the b&m store, and hence are
unwilling to pay higher prices.
Once more, computer-illiterate consumers with δ = 0 are drawn to the b&m store over distance,
x∗0 =
1
t
(
λ(θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
q2l
2 − pl)
)
Consumers with online discount factor δm who do not derive value from the b&m’s online portal, purchase
at the physical store as before. Recognizing that such consumers have the alternative to buy the product
online at the outset, they are drawn over a distance,
x∗m =
1
t
(
λ(θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
q2l
2 − pl)−
(δmE[θ]− c)2
2δm
)
Finally, consider consumers who derive value from the b&m store’s services even if they opt to buy at
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its online outlet. In equilibrium, the prices charged at the b&m store or its online outlet leave these con-
sumers indifferent between the two: the b&m store extracts the entire surplus from the service it provides
these consumers. Then, such consumers travel over the same distance, x∗m.
Thus, the expected profit of the b&m store when it operates an online outlet is
pi′I =
2
t
[(
µ0 + µm(1− α)
)(
λ(θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
q2l
2 − pl)
)
− µm(1− α) (δmE[θ]− c)
2
2δm
]
×(λ(ph − cqh) + (1− λ)(pl − cql)− s)
+2µmα
t
[
λ(θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
q2l
2 − pl)−
(δmE[θ]− c)2
2δm
]
×(λ(ph − cqh) + (1− λ)(pl − cql))− k.
Hence, it maximizes profits subject to the same constraints as when it does not operate an online portal
and faces internet competition.
The relevant benchmark for comparison is a setting where the physical store incurs a marginal cost of
handling customers but has no online presence. It is straightforward to show that with the online portal,
the physical store sets lower prices. This is because the portal increases its profit margin, as the ability to
divert consumers to the online portal reduces its marginal costs, encouraging it to draw more consumers.
The following is almost immediate:
Corollary 2. Fixing other parameters, there exist bounds, k1, k2 on the b&m store’s fixed costs of oper-
ation k, such that if k ∈ (k1, k2), the physical store’s operating profits do not cover its fixed costs, but its
online portal’s profits more than cover those losses. If k > k2 the b&m store exits the market.
If s = 0, total profits are the same with the portal as without—it does not matter where goods are sold
from the store’s perspective—but share αµmµ0+µm of its operating profits appear to accrue to its portal. When
s > 0, the portal increases the total profits. In both cases, whenever total net profits are positive, but the
share (1−α)µm+µ0µ0+µm of operating profits fail to cover the fixed costs, k, then the physical store appears to be
losing money, acting as a loss leader, as it were. However, it is only the presence of the physical store and
the services it provides portal users that allow the portal to price above marginal cost and make money.
From the perspective of consumers who are comfortable with self-installation, the portal appears to be
overcharging, offering uncompetitive prices. In fact, the physical store and portal provide a joint product
that appeals to those customers who benefit from the installation services that the physical store provides.
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1.4 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of electronic retailers on quality provision by a brick and mortar store. We
analyze how the b&m store’s strategic pricing, product selection and product quality provision evolve in
the face of increasing online competition from e-retailers. In our model some consumers do not know which
product they want until they physically visit a store. We characterize how increased online competition
due to improved online product provision affects the physical store’s strategic choices. As online utility
costs fall, the store moves from socially-efficient provision of product qualities and varieties, to reducing the
quality of its low quality products, next, to selective provision of high quality products, before returning to
socially-efficient provision of product quality and product varieties. Eventually, it exits the market when
the heightened price competition drives operating profits below the fixed costs of operation. Thus, we paint
the portrait of a physical store flailing to find a successful strategic plan in the face of increased online com-
petition. We conclude by exploring how outcomes are affected when the physical store also has an online
portal. We provide an explanation for why online portals of physical stores (a) win a share of the market
despite charging higher prices than other e-retailers; and (b) appear to be the profit driver for the firm.
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Chapter 2
Positive and Negative Campaigns
in Primary and General Elections
2.1 Introduction
The literature on political campaigning has highlighted the extent to which negative campaigning has
come to dominate the political debate between candidates prior to an election, and the consequences of
that campaigning for electoral outcomes. For example, 85 percent of the $404 million spent by President
Obama on advertising was negative in nature, while challenger Mitt Romney devoted 91 percent of his
$492 million budget to negative ads.1 What has received vastly less attention are the sharp differences in
the nature of campaigning in primary versus general elections. Campaigning has been far less negative in
primaries than in general elections, especially when the primary winner faces an established incumbent
candidate, and primary underdogs run more positive campaigns than front runners. For example, in the
2004 Democratic presidential primary, 38% of ads were negative, whereas in the general election 61%
were (CMAG). So, too, by mid-February in the 2012 Republican primary, the presumptive favorite Mitt
Romney ran 93% more negative ads than positive ads, while Gingrich, Paul and Santorum collectively
ran 27% more positive ads than negative ones.2
Our paper builds a model that delivers these dynamics of positive and negative campaigning. We
consider a setting in which two challengers compete against each other in a primary, with the winner
advancing to face an established incumbent from the opposing party in a general election.3 Candidates
only care about who wins the general election. Obviously, a challenging candidate hopes to win the general
election; failing that, he prefers that his party primary opponent win; and his least preferred outcome is
for the incumbent to be re-elected. The incumbent seeks to be re-elected.
In addition to his preferences over who wins the general election, each candidate is described by his
initial reputational stock, and a resource budget that can be devoted both to developing his own repu-
1Kantar Media’s Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG).
2http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/study-negative-campaign-ads-much-more-frequent-vicious-than-in-primaries-
past/2012/02/14/gIQAR7ifPR story.html
3The “incumbent” could alternatively be a winner of a primary for the opposing party.
16
tational stock via positive campaigning and to damaging an opponent’s reputational stock via negative
campaigning. Election outcomes are determined by a success function, where the probability a candidate
wins depends on his post-campaigning reputational stock and that of his opponent.4 A candidate chooses
both how extensively to campaign in each election, and the positive and negative composition of that cam-
paign. Negative and positive campaigning can have different impacts on reputations—the preponderance
of negative ads suggest that they have bigger impacts on reputations than positive ads, i.e., it is easier to
damage a reputation than to build one up. We also allow the effects of primary campaigning on a winning
challenger’s reputation to decay prior to a general election. This decay reflects that between the primary
and general election, voters may forget some of a primary campaign; and that the moderate voters who
determine who wins a general election may pay less attention to primary campaigns than party partisans.
Our paper characterizes how the primitives of the economy—(a) relative candidate strengths (re-
sources and reputations); (b) the technology of campaigning (effectiveness and decay); and (c) a candi-
date’s preferences over electoral outcomes (personally winning vs. having the party’s nominee win)—affect
the strategic calculus of campaigning. We first analyze campaigning in the general election. In the general
election, campaigning choices only reflect their relative effectiveness in influencing who wins the election.
As a result, in the general election, a candidate with sufficient resources equates marginal benefits by
allocating more resources to negative campaigning than to positive campaigning; and a candidate with
very limited resources only campaigns negatively.
In contrast, as long as the effects of primary campaigning do not fully decay prior to the general
election, a challenger campaigns relatively more positively (less negatively) in a primary than in a gen-
eral election—a greater share of primary expenditures are devoted toward positive campaigning. The
heightened focus on positive campaigning in primaries reflects two forces. First, when a candidate wins a
primary election, the benefits of positive campaigning in the primary enhance his reputational stock in the
general election, but the effects of negative campaigning against a primary opponent do not carry over.
Thus, a candidate benefits from a negative primary campaign only to the extent that it raises his chance
of winning the primary, giving him the opportunity to compete in the general election. Second, when a
candidate loses a primary, a positive primary campaign does not tar a primary opponent in the general
election, but negative campaigning does. That is, when a candidate loses the primary, any negative cam-
paigning adversely reduces his primary rival’s reputational stock, reducing the probability that he wins
4Contest functions have been used to model positive and negative campaigning in a static game between two candidates
(Soubeyran (2009)).
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the general election. Since challengers always want the incumbent to lose the general election regardless
of who wins the primary, this force causes them to reduce negative campaigning in primaries.
The less decay there is in the effects of primary campaigning, the relatively less challengers devote
to negative campaigning, and the more they devote to positive campaigning. Indeed, we establish that
if the effects of primary campaigning do not decay at all, and primary candidates are ex-ante symmetric
(with identical reputations, budgets and preferences) then primary campaigns feature more positive than
negative campaigning—the exact opposite of what happens in general elections. Thus, our theory can
reconcile the empirical observation that primary campaigns are less negative than general elections, and it
provides testable predictions regarding the composition of campaigning in primaries and general elections
as a function of the ‘importance’ of an election, which proxies for the extent of decay in the effects of
primary campaigning.
The shift toward positive campaigning and away from negative campaigning in a primary when more
of the effects of primary campaigning persist to the general election leads naturally to a conjecture that
reduced decay must raise the probability that the primary winner defeats the incumbent. In fact, this
need not be so: when negative campaigning is only marginally more effective than positive campaigning,
reduced decay also causes challengers to spend more in the primary. The reduction in the resources that a
primary winner has available for the general election can swamp the beneficial effects of reduced negative
primary campaigning in determining general election outcomes, when decay is substantial. Phrased dif-
ferently, the probability that the incumbent loses can be a hump-shaped function of the extent to which
the effects of primary campaigning carry over to the general election.
The ways in which challengers tradeoff between positive and negative campaigning in a primary
hinge on the strength of their general election opponent. If a primary winner will face a strong incumbent
who is well-regarded and has extensive resources, a bruising primary battle will weaken both challengers,
making them unlikely to win the general election. As a result, primary campaigns are more limited and
less negative when an incumbent is stronger. Facing a stronger incumbent, a challenger’s focus shifts from
bettering his own chances of being elected, to raising the probability that whoever wins the primary also
wins the general election. That is, facing a strong incumbent, it is a Pyrrhic victory for a challenger to
win a primary by expending resources in a negative campaign, if he, unlike the incumbent, then has a
small reputation stock and little way to enhance it.
Conversely, if the challengers have good reputations and extensive resources, or the incumbent is
weak and scandal-ridden, then the challengers understand that the primary winner is likely to win the
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general election. This causes them to shift their focus toward improving their own chances of getting
elected, encouraging them to campaign more aggressively (spending more, and being more negative) in
the primary. Symmetric increases in challenger reputations cause them to campaign more aggressively in
primaries, but less aggressively in the general election. In contrast, symmetric increases in their resources
cause them to campaign more aggressively and more negatively in both elections. This difference reflects
the fungibility of budgets, but not reputations.
How challengers campaign also depends on the extent to which their interests are aligned—if a chal-
lenger’s payoff when his primary opponent wins the general election rises, he cares less about who wins the
primary, and more about having the party’s nominee win the general election. As a result, challengers con-
serve their resources for the general election, and engage in relatively less negative primary campaigning.
The effectiveness of campaign advertising interacts subtly with a challenger’s resources to affect cam-
paigning choices. When reputations are more sensitive to campaigning, primary campaigning is reduced
and becomes more positive if challengers have limited budgets: a challenger’s resource disadvantage against
a strong incumbent is aggravated when reputations are more sensitive to campaigning advertising, causing
a challenger to hoard resources for the general election. Conversely, when a primary winner will have a
resource advantage in the general election, increasing the sensitivity of reputations has the opposite effect
on how challengers allocate resources.
Differences between challengers affect how they campaign against each other. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, when challengers are similar, increasing one challenger’s resources encourages both challengers
to campaign more aggressively in the primary, as long as each cares enough more about personally winning
versus having the incumbent lose. The effect on challenger i of giving him a little more resources than
his rival is straightforward—he campaigns more aggressively in the primary both because he has more
to spend in both elections, and because he will be the party’s stronger candidate in the general election.
The effect on his primary rival j is less clear: (1) challenger i is more likely to defeat the incumbent in
the general election, so j has an incentive to campaign less aggressively in the primary; but (2) because
challenger i campaigns more aggressively in the primary, j is more likely to lose, and because j wants
to be the party representative, j has an incentive to campaign more aggressively in the primary. When
challengers care enough more about winning rather than just have their party winning, it dominates,
causing the weaker rival to increase his primary campaigning.
For identical reasons, increasing one challenger’s reputation causes his rival to campaign more aggres-
sively in the primary, when they are similarly situated. However, paradoxically, improving i’s reputation
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causes him to campaign less aggressively in the primary whenever the incumbent is strong. This is because
i’s better reputation helps him in the primary, encouraging him to conserve resources to raise his chances
of defeating the strong incumbent in the general election. Improving i’s reputation only causes him to
campaign more aggressively in the primary when he faces a weak incumbent (with a poor reputation or
a limited budget)5
The effects of increased asymmetries are very different when one challenger is far stronger than the
other. Then, making a strong challenger even stronger causes his rival to reduce his primary campaigning,
especially his negative campaigning. The weak rival internalizes that his strong primary opponent is more
likely than he to win the general election, that negative primary campaigning reduces that probability,
and that greater primary campaigning reduces his already low chances of winning the general election.
As a result, a desire for the party’s nominee to defeat the incumbent causes the weak rival to campaign
less aggressively–spending less, and campaigning more positively. This, in turn, induces the stronger chal-
lenger to lower his primary campaigning too, because he is already likely to win the primary due to his
greater resources and reputation, and his primary rival’s less aggressive campaign. The stronger challenger
still spends far more, and is far more negative than his weaker rival in order to ensure victory. Thus,
our model delivers the pattern of primary campaigning in the 2012 Republican primary—Romney had a
stronger reputation and far greater resources, and hence he spent far more, and was much more negative
than his primary rivals.
The literature on positive and negative campaigns dates back to Skaperdas and Groffman (1995) and
Harrington and Hess (1996). Skaperdas and Groffman (1995) study the choice of negative and positive
campaigning by candidates in the context of two or three-candidate plurality elections. They predict that
when two candidates compete in an election, the front-runner engages in more positive and less negative
campaigning than his opponent. In a three-candidate contest, no candidate engages in negative campaign-
ing against the weakest opponent, so that to the extent there is negative campaigning, it is either directed
against the front-runner or it comes from the front-runner himself. Harrington and Hess (1996) explore
negative and positive campaigning in a spatial setting in which (a) agents begin with initial locations but
can engage in costly relocation, and (b) an agent’s relocation is affected by her rival’s actions as well.
They predict that the candidate who is perceived as having less attractive personal attributes runs a more
negative campaign.
5The opposing “incumbent” could also be the winner of the rival party’s primary—such an “incumbent” could be weak
if he has limited resources, or a low initial reputation.
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Chakrabarti (2007) extends Harrington and Hess (1995) by introducing a valence dimension that
captures personal traits such as integrity. Candidates can now influence both ideological and valance
factors via negative advertising: ideological spending shifts an opponent’s policy position away from the
median and valence spending reduces the opponent’s valence index. Candidates campaign more negatively
on the issue in which they have an advantage.
Polborn and Yi (2006) develop a model of negative and positive campaigning wherein each candi-
date can reveal a (good) attribute about himself, or a (bad) attribute about a competitor, and voters
update rationally about the information that is not transmitted. They predict that positive and negative
campaigning are equally likely.
Brueckner and Kangoh (2013) explore negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model, wherein
individual vote outcomes are stochastic due to the presence of a random, idiosyncratic valence effect
along with other shocks that affect all voters in common. A relatively centrist candidates campaign more
negatively than a relatively extreme candidate.
Peterson and Djupe (2005) empirically study the timing and the electoral context in which primary
races are likely to become negative. Using a content analysis of newspaper coverage of contested Senate
primaries, they find that negativity is an interdependent function of the timing during the race, the sta-
tus of the Senate seat (whether the seat is open, whether the incumbent is in the primary, etc.), and the
number and quality of the challengers in the primary (based on whether challengers previously held office).
The paper is structured as follows. We next present the model and central results. Section 2.3
analyzes outcomes when most of the effects of primary campaigns decay before the general election and
challengers have similar or identical preferences, reputations and budgets. Section 2.4 concludes the paper.
Proofs are collected in Appendix B.
2.2 Model
There are three candidates, i, j and I. Candidates i and j belong to the same party, while I belongs
to a different party and is presently in office. Challengers i and j first compete in a primary election,
with the winner advancing to face the incumbent I in a general election. Candidates only care about who
wins the general election—challenger k ∈ {i, j} receives a payoff Uk from winning and a payoff Vk if his
primary opponent wins the general election, and a normalized payoff of 0 if the incumbent wins, where
Uk > Vk > 0. The incumbent receives a positive payoff if he is re-elected, and none if he loses.
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Electoral outcomes are determined by a contest, where the probability a candidate wins rises with
his reputation, and declines with his opponent’s reputation. Specifically, in a primary election, if Z¯i0 and
Z¯j0 are the candidates’ respective reputational stocks just prior to the election, then candidate i wins with
probability Z¯i0
Z¯i0+Z¯j0
, and candidate j wins with residual probability. An analogous contest determines the
winner of the general election.
Candidate k ∈ {i, j, I} starts out with an initial reputational stock of X¯k, and a resource budget
B¯k. A candidate can devote his resources both to developing his own reputational stock via positive cam-
paigning and to destroying his opponent’s reputational stock via negative campaigning. In the primary
election, if candidate k ∈ {i, j} invests pk0 into positive campaigning to boost his own reputation, and his
rival k˜ spends nk0 on negatively campaigning to reduce k’s reputation, then candidate k’s reputational
stock in the primary becomes Z¯k0 = X¯k (1+pk0)
α
(1+ρnk˜0)α
. Here α > 0 captures the sensitivity of a candidate’s
reputational stock to campaigning and ρ captures the effectiveness of negative campaigning relative to
positive campaigning. In most of our analysis, we presume that negative campaigning has a greater in-
fluence on candidate reputations than positive campaigning, i.e., that ρ > 1. This structure allows us to
reconcile the preponderance of negative campaigning in political campaigns.
If candidate k wins the primary, then he enters the general election with a reputational stock of
Z¯k1 = X¯k (1+βpk0)
α
(1+βρnk˜0)α
. Here, β ∈ [0, 1] captures the observation that the effects of primary campaigns
on candidate reputations decay prior to a general election. A small β, i.e., extensive decay, can reflect
both that voters largely forget primary campaigns by the time of the general election and that primary
campaigns appeal more narrowly to party partisans, and the more moderate voters who determine the
general election winner pay less attention to primary campaigns. The extent of decay may vary with the
electoral context, reflecting that, for example, only Republicans/Democrats follow developments in their
respective party primary campaigns for the House, but more voters follow presidential campaigns closely.
In the general election, challenger k’s final reputational stock is Z¯k2 = Z¯k1 (1+pk1)
α
(1+ρnI1)α , and the incumbent’s
final reputational stock is Z¯I2 = X¯I (1+pI1)
α
(1+ρnk1)α , k ∈ {i, j}.
Challenger k’s total electoral resource constraint is
∑1
t=0 pkt + nkt ≤ B¯k (where pkt, nkt ≥ 0). Thus,
when challenger k wins the primary, he has funds B¯k − (p∗k0 + n∗k0) ≡ B¯k1 at his disposal in the general
election. The incumbent’s resource constraint is pI1 + nI1 ≤ B¯I ≡ B¯I1.
Without loss of generality, we write challenger k ∈ {i, j}’s ex ante expected payoff as
pik = (MkPrk1 − Prk˜1)Prk0 + Prk˜1,
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where Mk = UkVk captures the relative payoff challenger k receives from winning the general election versus
having his primary opponent win, and Prkt is the probability that k wins the primary (t = 0) or general
(t = 1) election. When we compare how differences in challengers affect how they campaign, it eases
characterizations to assume that Mk ≥ 3, i.e., challengers strongly prefer personally winning the general
election to having a primary rival win.6
We pose our analysis in a setting where two challengers face off in a primary with the winner facing
an incumbent in the general election. However, it follows directly that our analysis describes equilibrium
outcomes when, rather than facing an incumbent in the general election, the two possibly heterogeneous
challengers will face the winner of a primary in the rival party, and the other party’s candidates are sym-
metric in all regards. In this setting, the challengers care only about the equilibrium reputational stock and
resource budget that their general election rival will have, and not about who wins the rival party’s primary.
We begin by characterizing equilibrium campaigning in a general election.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, in the general election, as long as candidate k ∈ {i, j, I} has sufficient
resources at his disposal so that Bk1 > ρ−1ρ , then candidate k engages in both positive and negative cam-
paigning, albeit allocating more resources to negative campaigning:
n∗k1 =
Bk1
2 +
ρ− 1
2ρ and p
∗
k1 =
Bk1
2 −
ρ− 1
2ρ .
If, instead, candidate k ∈ {i, j, I} has only modest funds at his disposal, Bk1 < ρ−1ρ , then k only campaigns
negatively, n∗k1 = Bk1 and p∗k1 = 0.
The proof follows directly. The probability challenger k ∈ i, j defeats the incumbent is
Prk1 =
Z¯k2
Z¯k2 + Z¯I2
=
Z¯k1
(1+pk1)α
(1+ρnI1)α
Z¯k1
(1+pk1)α
(1+ρnI1)α + X¯I
(1+pI1)α
(1+ρnk1)α
,
which, written as a function of what k controls in the general election, takes the form
Prk1 =
a(1 + pk1)α
a(1 + pk1)α + b/(1 + ρnk1)α
,
where a and b are positive constants. Multiplying numerator and denominator by (1 + ρnk1)/b, and
6We also make the implicit premise that when one challenger is far stronger than his rival, the weak rival cares enough
about personally winning that he prefers to win the primary, to having the stronger challenger win, even though this means
that the incumbent is more likely to win re-election.
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simplifying yields
Prk1 =
a[(1 + pk1)α(1 + ρnk1)α]/b
a[(1 + pk1)α(1 + ρnk1)α]/b+ 1
,
implying that challenger k maximizes (1 + pk1)α(1 + ρnk1)α ≡ [Pk1Nk1]α in the general election.
In the general election, only the relative effectiveness of each form of campaigning in influencing
election outcomes matters for how candidates allocate their resources. Because ρ > 1 means that negative
campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning—it is easier to tear down a reputation than build
one up—candidates spend more on negative campaigns than positive ones, and whenever their budgets are
sufficiently limited, they only negatively campaign. Thus, we predict that especially weak/underfunded
challengers only campaign “against” an incumbent in the general election, and that the greater is a can-
didate’s budget, the greater is the share the candidate devotes to positive campaigning.
Proposition 5 establishes that candidates campaign relatively more positively in the primary than in
the general election.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, provided candidate k ∈ {i, j} devotes any resources to positive campaign-
ing, he campaigns relatively more positively in the primary than in the general election: n∗k0 − p∗k0 ≤
n∗k1 − p∗k1 = ρ−1ρ , where the inequality is strict unless β = 0.
As long as the effects of primary campaigns do not fully decay before the general election, a candidate
campaigns relatively more positively in the primary than in the general election for two reasons: (1) there
is a lingering beneficial effect of positive campaigning in the primary on the challenger’s reputation in
the general election too, should he survive the primary election; and (2) the adverse effects of negative
campaigning in the primary against his party rival also carry over to the general election, should the
latter emerge from the primary victoriously. Both effects induce a challenger to allocate relatively more
resources in a primary toward positive campaigns, and away from negative campaigns.
We next characterize how candidates’ primary campaigns are affected when more of the effects of
primary campaigning on reputation persist to the general election.
Proposition 6. Suppose that challengers are symmetric, with identical reputations, budgets and prefer-
ences. Then there exists a βˆ ∈ (0, 1], such that for all β ≤ βˆ, increases in β:
1. Reduce negative campaigning in the primary election.
2. Increase positive campaigning in the primary provided a challenger campaigns positively, as long as
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the resources of challengers are not too great.
3. When ρ is close to one, so that negative campaigning is not much more effective than positive cam-
paigning, the increase in positive primary campaigning exceeds the decrease in negative campaigning
implying that total primary campaigning expenditures rise.
That is, when the beneficial effects of primary campaigns persist more strongly, candidates campaign
relatively more positively and less negatively in the primary. In fact, if enough of the effects of primary
campaigning persist to the general election, challengers campaign more positively than negatively in the
primary:
Proposition 7. Suppose that challengers are symmetric, with identical reputations, budgets and pref-
erences. Then when enough of the effects of primary campaigns persist, and challengers have enough
resources that they campaign positively in both elections, they campaign more positively than negatively in
the primary. That is, there exists a β∗ ∈ (0, 1] such that if β ≥ β∗, then p∗k0 > n∗k0.
Figure 2.1: Primary campaigning and probability that a challenger wins in the general election as a func-
tion of the extent to which primary campaigning decays when challengers have limited resources. Parameters:
X¯I = 100, B¯I = 200, X¯k = 50, B¯k = 100,Mk = 10, ρ = 2, α = 2, k ∈ {i, j}.
The analytical characterizations in Propositions 6 and 7 only obtain when β is sufficiently small or
large. However, a numerical analysis reveals that these results extend to intermediate levels of β. That
is, as more of the effects of primary campaigning persist to affect general election reputations, positive
campaigning in the primary rises while negative campaigning falls. Further, consistent with Proposition 6,
Figure 2.1 illustrates that when there is nearly complete decay in effects of primary campaigning prior to
the general election, total primary campaign expenditures rise with β. A consequence is that with less re-
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sources remaining for challengers to devote to the general election (and modest persistence of the effects of
primary campaigning), the probability a challenger actually wins the general election initially decreases as
decay first falls. It is only when enough of the effects of primary campaigning persist that the probability
a challenger wins rises with further increases in β. Figure 2.1 illustrates a scenario where the incumbent
is far stronger than the challengers; but the same qualitative patterns hold when challengers are stronger.
2.3 Comparative statics
We next derive how changes in the primitives describing the economy affect campaigning when challengers
are symmetric, with identical resources, reputations and preferences, and β is small enough that primary
campaigning has only modest effects on a candidate’s reputation in the general election. The latter may
be expected to hold in elections for the House or Senate where only party partisans follow developments
in their party primaries, but moderate voters follow general election campaigning closely.
We first note that when β is close to zero, the direction of the impact of changes in primitives is
the same for n∗i0 and p∗i0 at an interior optimum, since n∗i0 − p∗i0 → ρ−1ρ (save possibly for a change in ρ).
Further, one can derive the effect on the direction of changes in n∗i1 and p∗i1 via the impact on the resource
constraint. At an equilibrium (n∗i0, p∗i0, n∗j0, p∗j0),
∂2pii
∂θ∂ni0︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect of a change in θ
+
indirect effect via change in i’s actions︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2pii
∂ni02
dni0
dθ
+ ∂
2pii
∂pi0∂ni0
dpi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pii
∂pj0∂ni0
dpj0
dθ
+ ∂
2pii
∂nj0∂ni0
dnj0
dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect via change in j’s actions
= 0.
for θ ∈ X¯I , B¯I , α. Also, when challengers are symmetric, a change in their budgets, preferences or repu-
tations involves equal changes in both B¯i, B¯j , or Mi,Mj , or X¯i, X¯j so that
∂2pii
∂θi∂ni0
+ ∂
2pii
∂θj∂ni0︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect of a change in θi, θj
+
indirect effect via change in i’s actions︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2pii
∂ni02
(
dni0
dθi
+ dni0
dθj
)
+ ∂
2pii
∂pi0∂ni0
(
dpi0
dθi
+ dpi0
dθj
)
+ ∂
2pii
∂pj0∂ni0
(
dpj0
dθi
+ dpj0
dθj
)
+ ∂
2pii
∂nj0∂ni0
(
dnj0
dθi
+ dnj0
dθj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect via change in j’s actions
= 0.
Lemma 1. Suppose that challengers have identical endowments, budgets and preferences. Then when
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β = 0, sign{dni0dθ } = sign{ ∂
2pii
∂θ∂ni0
} and sign{dni0dθi + dni0dθj } = sign{ ∂
2pii
∂θi∂ni0
+ ∂2pii∂θj∂ni0 } .
The lemma states that the indirect effect of a change in a parameter on n∗i0, p∗i0 in a symmetric equilib-
rium, reinforces, or if in the opposite direction, is outweighed by the direct effect. This means that we can
derive the sign of the changes in n∗i0 and p∗i0 from the sign of the partial derivatives, ∂
2pi
∂θ∂ni0
, ∂
2pii
∂θi∂ni0
+ ∂2pii∂θj∂ni0 ,
alone. Proposition 8 derives the impacts of changes in the challengers’ budgets, reputations and preferences
on primary campaigning when challengers are symmetric.
Proposition 8. Suppose challengers have identical endowments, budgets and preferences, and that they
have enough resources that they engage in both positive and negative campaigning in both elections. Then
for all β sufficiently small,
1. Improving challenger reputations, X¯i = X¯j ≡ X¯C , causes challengers to increase both positive and
negative primary campaigning. Their campaigning expenditures in the general election fall, but the
probability they defeat the incumbent rises.
2. Increasing challenger resources, B¯i = B¯j ≡ B¯C , causes challengers to increase positive and negative
campaigning in both elections. The probability a challenger defeats the incumbent rises.
3. Increasing challenger payoffs, Ui = Uj ≡ UC , from winning office, or reducing payoffs, Vi = Vj ≡ VC ,
when a party rival wins office, causes challengers to raise both positive and negative primary cam-
paigning. The probability that a challenger defeats the incumbent falls.
When challengers have better reputations, whoever wins the party primary is more likely to defeat
the incumbent. In turn, challengers campaign more aggressively in the primary. Reinforcing the direct
effect, when i campaigns more negatively in the primary, this causes j to campaign more negatively. This
is because with less funds for the general election, i’s chances of defeating the incumbent fall, making j
more worried about losing the primary to i (j wants to be assured of a party win, at the least).
Greater resources allow challengers to spend more in both elections, improving their chances of win-
ning both races. The effects of greater resources on general election campaigning differ from the effects
of better reputations: improving challenger reputations raises primary campaigning expenditures, but re-
duces general election expenditures; in contrast, the fungibility of resources means that increased resources
are spread across both elections.
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Finally, increases in Mi,Mj mean that challengers care more about winning than just about oust-
ing the incumbent from office. As a result, the challengers campaign more aggressively in the primary,
reducing the chances that the party’s nominee wins the general election.
A numerical analysis reveals that the comparative statics in Proposition 8 mostly extend regardless
of the extent of persistence β in the effects of primary campaigning on reputations in the general election.
Finally, we observe that the analytical results in Proposition 8 could have been posed on the impacts of
identical increases in both challenger’s reputations or resources or payoff parameters when challengers are
close enough to being identical.
Proposition 9. Suppose that challengers have sufficiently similar reputations, resources and preferences,
and that they have enough resources that they positively and negatively campaign in both elections. Then
for all sufficiently small β, increasing an incumbent’s resources, B¯I , or improving his reputation, X¯I ,
causes both challengers to reduce both positive and negative campaigning in the primary. Their campaign-
ing expenditures in the general election rise, but the probability they defeat the stronger incumbent falls.
When the incumbent is stronger, primary campaigning falls — facing a stronger incumbent, chal-
lengers limit their spending in the primary to save more for the general election. Further, the strategic
complementarities in campaigning mean that when i spends less on campaigning in the primary, j also
lowers his primary campaigning. Again this reflects that since i saves more funds for the general election,
i is more likely to defeat the incumbent. As a result, j is less worried about losing the primary to i. A
numerical study reveals that these results hold regardless of the extent β of decay in the effects of primary
campaigning.
Proposition 10. Suppose that challengers have sufficiently similar reputations, resources and prefer-
ences, and that they have enough resources that they positively and negatively campaign in both elections.
Then for all sufficiently small β, there exists a B¯∗i (β), such that if challenger resources exceed B¯∗i (β),
i.e., B¯i > B¯∗i (β), increasing the sensitivity, α, of reputations to campaigns causes challengers to increase
their campaigning in the primary. Their campaigning expenditures in the general election decrease, but
the probability that they defeat the incumbent rises. If, instead, B¯i < B¯∗i (β), the opposite holds.
Increases in the sensitivity of reputations to campaigning, α, reduce negative campaigning in the
primary if and only if challengers have sufficiently limited resources that they will have less funds in the
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general election than the incumbent. This is because the challengers, when crippled by low budgets, are
unable to campaign as intensely as the incumbent in the general election. Increasing the sensitivity of rep-
utations to campaigning aggravates this disadvantage, causing them to reduce their primary campaigning
expenditures. Even though the challengers devote more of their resources to the general election, they
still fail to match the incumbent’s spending, so their chances of defeating the incumbent fall as α rises.
The opposite occurs if the challengers will have more resources at their disposal in the general election
than the incumbent; and if B¯i = B¯∗i , increasing the sensitivity of reputations to campaigning has no effect
on outcomes. A numerical study reveals that these results hold for all values of β.
We conclude by investigating how differences between the two challengers affect how they campaign.
We first consider how small differences affect challenger choices.
Proposition 11. Suppose that challengers have sufficiently similar reputations, resources and preferences,
and enough resources that they campaign both positively and negatively in both elections. Then for all β
sufficiently small,
1. Improving challenger i’s reputation, X¯i, causes challenger j to increase his primary campaigning,
reducing his chances of winning the general election. Improving challenger i’s reputation causes i to
campaign more aggressively in the primary if and only if the incumbent is sufficiently weak.
2. Increasing challenger i’s resources, B¯i, causes both challengers to increase both positive and negative
primary campaigning.
3. Raising challenger i’s payoff, Ui, from being elected to office, or reducing his payoff, Vi, if his party
opponent wins office, causes both challengers to spend more on primary campaigns, reducing their
chances of winning the general election.
When challenger i’s reputation is better, challenger j devotes more resources to primary campaign-
ing. There are offsetting considerations. On the one hand, challenger i’s better reputation improves the
party’s chances in the general election should i survive the primary, providing challenger j an incentive
to campaign less aggressively in the primary. On the other hand, challenger i’s stronger reputation also
helps him in the primary, and challenger j prefers to personally win the general election than just to have
his primary rival defeat the incumbent from the other party. As long as Mi = Ui/Vi ≥ 3, the desire to
personally win the general election dominates, causing challenger j to step up primary campaigning in
response to a stronger party rival.
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One might think that improving challenger i’s reputation always encourages him to coast on his
better reputation in the primary by reducing his primary expenditures, to conserve more resources to
defeat the incumbent in the general election. In fact, i does this only if the incumbent is sufficiently
strong. When the incumbent is relatively weak, i.e., when i is likely to win the general election if he
manages to win the primary, then improving i’s reputation causes him to devote more resources to the
primary. With a weak incumbent (e.g., with a scandal-ridden incumbent, or a weak challenger from a
rival party primary), challenger i’s toughest battle becomes the primary, and he responds to the increased
campaigning intensity by challenger j by raising his primary campaigning.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate how challenger i’s reputation affects the primary campaigning choices
of both challengers when they face a strong and weak incumbent, respectively, and β = 0 so that all
effects of primary campaigning decay prior to the general election, while Figure 2.4 shows the effects of
Figure 2.2: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s reputation when the incumbent is strong and the effects of
primary campaigning decay. Parameters: β = 0, B¯I = 900, X¯I = 150, X¯j = 60, B¯j = B¯i = 700,Mj = Mi = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2.
Figure 2.3: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s reputation when the incumbent is weak and the effects of
primary campaigning decay. Parameters: β = 0, B¯I = 100, X¯I = 150, X¯j = 60, B¯j = B¯i = 700,Mj = Mi = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2.
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Figure 2.4: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s reputation when the incumbent is strong and effects of primary
campaigning persist. Parameters: β = 1, B¯I = 900, X¯I = 150, X¯j = 60, B¯j = B¯i = 700,Mj = Mi = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2.
challenger i’s reputation when β = 1. This analysis sheds light on what happens when one challenger is
much stronger than the other. Consistent with Proposition 11, the figures reveal that when challengers are
close to symmetric (when X¯i is close to 60) and β = 0, improvements in i’s reputation always induce his
primary challenger j to campaign more aggressively. In contrast, improvements in i’s own reputation cause
i to campaign more aggressively in the primary when the incumbent is weak, but not when he is strong.
The effects of improving challenger i’s reputation are very different when one challenger has a far
stronger reputation than the other. For instance, if the incumbent is strong and i has a much stronger
reputation than j, then i would rather devote the bulk of his resources to the general election, and his
stronger reputation allows him to do so, while remaining confident of winning the primary. Now, as
challenger i’s reputation advantage grows further, challenger j responds not by increasing his primary
campaign expenditures, but by reducing them. This is because challenger j internalizes the fact that i
is far more likely than he to win the general election, that negative primary campaigning reduces that
probability and that greater primary campaigning reduces his own already low chances of winning the
general election. In contrast, when i is far weaker than j, slight improvements in i’s reputation cause j
to campaign more aggressively in the primary, as j now worries more that i may win the primary.
Contrasting Figures 2.2 and 2.4 reveal qualitatively similar shape features for the most part. How-
ever, when the effects of primary campaigning do not decay, i.e., when β = 1, candidates campaign less
negatively in the primary, but far more positively. When β = 1, and challenger i’s reputation is low,
initial increases in his reputational stock cause him to increase his negative primary campaigning (which
raises his chances of winning the primary), accompanied by a decline in positive and total campaigning
expenditures in the primary. This allows him to devote more resources to the general election where he
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faces a strong incumbent. However, once i’s reputation is sufficiently higher than j’s, further increases in
i’s reputation cause him to reduce his negative campaigning in the primary, as his strong reputation is
now likely to be enough to secure a primary win. The effects of further increases in i’s reputation on j’s
campaigning are very different, when i is far stronger than j: j responds by sharply reducing his negative
campaigning so as to not adversely affect his party opponent’s chances in the general election; but to
compensate j steps up his positive primary campaigning to improve his own chances of winning.
Figure 2.5: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s resources, when challenger j’s resources are not “high
enough” and the effects of primary campaigning decay. Parameters: β = 0, X¯j = 40, B¯j = 65, X¯i = 50,Mj = Mi = 10, B¯I =
110, X¯I = 100, α = 2, ρ = 2.
Proposition 11 also establishes that when the challengers are similar, increasing challenger i’s re-
sources causes both challengers to campaign more aggressively in the primary. That challenger j raises
his primary campaigning expenditures reflects the same considerations that drive him when his primary
opponent’s reputation improves—as long as j cares enough more about winning than about just having
his party’s nominee win, he devotes more resources to defeating his stronger primary rival. In contrast to
the effects of increasing challenger i’s reputation on his primary campaigning (which hinge on the relative
strength of the incumbent), giving i more resources always induces him to campaign more aggressively in
both the primary and the general election. This reflects that campaign resources are fungible, and can be
allocated at will across both elections, but reputations are not.
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show how primary campaigning by the two challengers varies with challenger i’s
resources when β = 0, while Figure 2.7 does so for β = 17. The qualitative impacts of a stronger challenger
are roughly similar regardless of whether a challenger is stronger due to having more resources or a better
7The parameter values used to construct Figure 2.5 make the incumbent a strong opponent in the general election.
We vary multiple parameters vis a vis the other figures to better illustrate the qualitative features (i.e., the hump-shaped
relationship between challenger i’s resources and both negative and positive primary campaigning by both challengers).
Thus, as challenger i’s budget increases beyond a point, both lower their spending in the primary and devote more to the
general election where they face a strong adversary.
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Figure 2.6: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s resources, when challenger j’s resources are “high enough”
and the effects of primary campaigning decay. Parameters: β = 0, X¯I = 150, B¯I = 900, B¯j = 700, X¯j = X¯i = 60,Mj =
Mi = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2.
Figure 2.7: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s resources when the effects of primary campaigning persist.
Parameters: β = 1, X¯I = 150, B¯I = 900, B¯j = 700, X¯j = X¯i = 60,Mj = Mi = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2.
reputation, subject to the caveat regarding the fungibility of resources. This reflects that the key strategic
force is the relative strength of one challenger relative to the other challenger and to the incumbent, and
not the source of the strength. Concretely, when one challenger is far stronger than the other, further
increases in that challenger’s strength causes his rival to sharply reduce his negative campaigning in the
primary and to raise his positive campaigning. Thus, our model can reconcile the composition of cam-
paigning in the 2012 Republican primary by Romney and his rivals—the far stronger Romney campaigned
far more negatively than positively, whereas his weaker rivals did the opposite. Moreover, when Gingrich
appeared to gain in reputation following the South Carolina primary, Romney massively increased his
campaigning, particularly his negative campaigning against Gingrich in the next primaries.
The final result in Proposition 11 shows that increasing challenger i’s payoff when he is elected to
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Figure 2.8: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s preferences when the effects of primary campaigning decay.
Parameters: β = 0, X¯I = 150, B¯I = 900,Mj = 10, X¯j = X¯i = 60, B¯j = B¯i = 700, α = 1, ρ = 2.
office so that he cares more about winning himself rather than just ensuring a party win causes i to
campaign more aggressively in the primary. But this reduces the funds available for campaigning in the
general election, owing to which his chances of ousting the incumbent are lowered. This induces chal-
lenger j to campaign aggressively in the primary too as it is now more imperative that he win the primary
election. Figure 2.8 depicts this relationship when β = 0 while Figure 2.9 does so for β = 1. Consistent
Figure 2.9: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s preferences when the effects of primary campaigning persist.
Parameters: β = 1, X¯I = 150, B¯I = 900,Mj = 10, X¯j = X¯i = 60, B¯j = B¯i = 700, α = 1, ρ = 2.
with the proposition, we see that when challenger i cares more about personally winning, he steps up his
primary campaigning in order to ensure a win for himself. This lowers his chances of a win in the general
election so that in response challenger j increases his primary campaigning, too. Figure 2.9 highlights the
consequences for the composition of campaigns. When challenger i cares more about personally winning,
he increasingly opts for the more effective form of campaigning, i.e. a negative campaign to ensure a
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win. Positive campaigning levels decrease but total campaigning expenditures in the primary increase so
that fewer resources are left over for the general election. Apprehensive of a party defeat in the general
election should i survive the primary election, the other challenger steps up his positive and total primary
campaigning expenditures in order to improve his chances of a win in the primary8.
2.4 Conclusion
In recent years, negative campaigning has come to dominate the airwaves in general elections through-
out the entire United States. What has received far less attention is that much of the campaigning in
primaries is positive in nature. Our paper analyzes such campaigning, providing an explanation for the
preponderance of negative campaigning in general elections, but positive campaigning in primaries. The
negative campaigning in general elections reflects that candidates only care about winning the general
election—and it is easier to damage an opponent’s reputation via negative campaigning than to build up
one’s own reputation via positive campaigning. Two considerations drive why primary campaigns are less
negative: candidates internalize both that a primary winner benefits in the general election only from
his positive primary campaigning; and a primary loser, impairs his party rival’s chances in the general
election by campaigning negatively. More generally, we derive how (a) relative strengths of candidates
(initial resources and reputations), (b) how much candidates care about winning vs just having their party
win, and (c) the campaigning technology (effectiveness, decay in the effects of primary campaigning before
the general election) affect the magnitudes and composition of campaigning in both elections.
Our paper characterizes how the primitives of the economy—(a) relative candidate strengths (re-
sources and reputations); (b) the technology of campaigning (effectiveness and decay); and (c) a candi-
date’s preferences over electoral outcomes (personally winning vs. having the party’s nominee win)—affect
the strategic calculus of campaigning. We show, for example, that if challengers are similarly situated,
with comparable resources and reputations, then improving one challenger’s reputation causes his primary
rival to respond by campaigning more aggressively; but the challenger with the enhanced reputation only
campaigns more aggressively if the incumbent is sufficiently weak, as then the primary winner is also the
likely general election winner. Increases in one challenger’s resources, however, causes both challengers to
8When challenger j is somewhat stronger and cares more about personally winning, and the incumbent is some-
what weaker than in the scenario illustrated in Figure 2.9 (e.g., when X¯j = 70, X¯I = 100 and Mj = 20 rather than
X¯j = 60, X¯I = 150 and Mj = 10) then challenger j’s negative primary campaigning rises with Mi rather than falling as
in Figure 2.9. This reflects the twin effects of caring more about personally winning, and the increased probability that if
challenger j wins the primary he will also win the general election.
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campaign more aggressively in the primary—the challenger with the increased resources exploits their fun-
gibility, splitting them across both elections, while his rival increases his spending to offset this advantage.
The impact of primitives are very different when one challenger is far stronger than the other. Making
a strong challenger even stronger causes his rival to reduce his negative campaigning. The weak rival inter-
nalizes that his strong primary opponent is more likely than he to win the general election. As a result, a
desire for the party’s nominee to defeat the incumbent causes the weak rival to campaign less aggressively—
spending less, and campaigning more positively. This, in turn, induces the stronger challenger to lower his
primary campaigning too, because he is already likely to win the primary due to his greater resources and
reputation, and his primary rival’s less aggressive campaign. The stronger challenger still spends far more,
and is far more negative than his weaker rival in order to ensure victory. Thus, our model delivers the
pattern of primary campaigning in the 2012 Republican primary—Romney had a stronger reputation and
far greater resources, and hence he spent far more, and was much more negative than his primary rivals.
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Chapter 3
Quality Provision and Pricing when
Consumer Valuations are Continuous
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a dramatic surge in online shopping as the ease and reliability of online purchases
has improved.1 In this paper, we study the strategic choices of product variety, quality and pricing of
products by a brick and mortar store in the face of online competition by electronic retailers. We find
that as online competition increases, the store initially lowers its prices in order to retain consumers who
would otherwise switch to online purchases and this move initially allows it to attract more consumers
than before. However, the store is unable to match the competitive offers available online for long; when
the spread of consumer valuations is high, as online products become better substitutes, consumers with
relatively low valuations increasingly switch to online products. The low quality product of the store now
caters to the tastes of consumers with higher valuations than before: the store begins to increase the
quality and price of its low quality products. To prevent its high valuation consumers from switching over
to the low quality product, the store raises the quality of its high quality product too; the latter is now
targeted at consumers with higher valuations. All the while, its profits decline and the store eventually
exits the market when its unable to meet its fixed operating costs.
The model is largely similar to that in Bernhardt and Ghosh (2014) with two distinctions: consumer
valuation types are uniformly distributed over an interval and consumers have a common discount factor.
Thus, in our model, consumers are only distinguished by (1) their costs of traveling to the brick and
mortar store and (2) their preferences for quality. As a benchmark, we consider the case where the utility
costs from online purchases are prohibitive, so the physical store is a monopolist. We show numerically
that there exists a threshold of consumer valuation of quality such that consumers with valuations below
the threshold buy the low quality product while those with valuations above the threshold buy the high
1 A 2010 Nielsen survey, Global Trends in Online Shopping, A Nielsen Global Consumer Report (June 2010), found that
84% of consumers shop online, and online shopping accounted for more than 5 percent of total monthly spending for 56
percent of the respondents.
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quality product. Further, we lose the price equivalence result of Bernhardt and Ghosh (2014): an increase
in the price of the high quality products when suitably matched by a decline in the price of the low quality
product (and vice versa) does not deliver the same expected return to consumers from visiting the store
and the same expected payoff to the store, so that prices are perfectly pinned down to those that maximize
profits for the monopolist.
Once the utility costs of online purchases fall by enough, e-retailers operate. As expected, the price
and quality levels in the benchmark setting are nearly identical to the equilibrium qualities and prices that
prevail when online retailers operate in the market and the discount factor δ is very low. This is because
when the discounted payoff from online purchases is very low, the store effectively operates as a monopoly.
However, as the discount factor increases, online competition begins to impinge on the ability of the store
to freely set its product variety, quality and pricing. When the support of consumer valuations of quality
is high, the store initially offers products of nearly the same quality at increasingly lower prices as the
discount factor increases. This move initially lures consumers with very low valuations to buy at the store
when online competition is low. However, the store is unable to match the competitive offers online for
long and quits catering to those with very low valuations eventually. Instead, its products begin to cater
to consumers with relatively higher valuations than before and consequently the quality of its products
increases. All the while, the store witnesses a steady decline in profits as the number of consumers who
visit and buy at the store decreases along with the prices it charges for some of its products.
A decrease in marginal costs is found to increase the quality and prices of products while an increase
in the travel costs is found to decrease the number of consumers visiting and buy at the store and its
profits only, while leaving other strategy choices of product variety, quality and pricing unchanged. Lastly,
when the support of consumer valuations is very small, the store offers the same quality to the same set
of consumer types at increasingly lower prices. This is because when the spread of consumer valuations
is low, consumers who buy either of the two products have relatively similar valuations (than when the
spread is high). Hence, the products are a better match than those available online for all consumers
who buy it as long as the price difference is not too high. Consequently, even when online competition
intensifies, the store continues to cater to the same set of consumer valuation types and offers the same
qualities at steadily declining prices.
Related literature. Our paper builds on work dating back to Mussa and Rosen (1978), Goldman et al.
(1980), Spence (1980), and Maskin and Riley (1984) that explores price discrimination via quantity dis-
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counts and pricing of products of different qualities by monopolists facing heterogeneous consumers with
different private valuations. In these models, in contrast to our benchmark setting, the optimal mechanism
distorts quality downward for all but those with the highest willingness to pay, because downward incen-
tive compatibility constraints bind. Rochet and Stole (1997) study duopoly nonlinear pricing in a model
with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. When the degree of horizontal differentiation is so
large that each firm is a local monopolist, perfect sorting arises, with quality distortions for all types but
at the top and the bottom. In contrast, with little horizontal differentiation, the market is fully covered
on both vertical and horizontal dimensions, and firms offer a cost-plus-fee pricing schedule with efficient
quality provision. A more general analysis in Rochet and Stole (2002) covers both monopoly and duopoly,
and allows for general distributions.
The most closely-related paper is Bernhardt and Ghosh (2014). The distinctions in the model are two
fold: it assumes that consumer valuation types are either high or low and the consumers’ discount factor
δ may take any of the three values {0, δm, 1}. It finds that if online competition is modest, the physical
store provides the socially-efficient product qualities and varieties, and earns monopoly profits. As online
competition intensifies, it begins to bite for consumers who have low quality valuations, as the utility
loss from online purchases is lower for them. In response, the physical store reduces the price of its low
quality good, eventually creating own product line competition, which impinges on its ability to extract
the consumer surplus of those with the highest willingness to pay. To continue to extract rents from high
valuation consumers, the store first distorts the quality of its low quality product. Next, provided there are
enough high valuation consumers, and product valuations are not so different, the store stops providing
the low quality product, focusing exclusively on selling high quality products. However, this stage does not
last. As online competition intensifies further, the best alternative for high valuation consumers is now not
the physical store’s low quality product, but instead a high quality product available online. As a result,
the store returns to producing a full line of products at the socially-optimal quality levels. Of course, the
store’s profits decline throughout, and eventually it cannot cover its operating costs and exits. It then
extends this analysis to show how outcomes are affected when the physical store also has an online portal.
Another closely related paper is Loginova (2009). It models competition between electronic retailers
and brick and mortar stores that sell a homogeneous product to consumers with heterogeneous valua-
tions (high or low) who only learn their valuations after visiting the store. Paradoxically, the presence of
electronic retailers causes brick and mortar stores to raise prices. Rather than compete for low valuation
consumers against e-retailers, stores target only high valuation consumers, whose demands are less price
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elastic. Low valuation consumers return home and buy online. Our paper extends the analysis by studying
quality provision and pricing by stores and how they evolve in the face of increasing online competition.
The idea that consumers must learn by visiting a store also appears in the price search literature that
dates back to Stahl (1979), and continues on in research such as Ellison’s (2005) model of add-on pricing
in which firms advertise a base price for a product and try to induce customers with a high willingness to
pay to buy high-priced add-ons at the point of sale.
There is a burgeoning literature on consumer and firm behavior in online environments. Alba et al
(1997), Danaher et al. (2003), Peterson et al. (1997), and Ratchford et al. (2001) conduct empirical anal-
yses of the differences between online and offline purchase experiences, focusing on assessing the impact
of prices, brand names and product attributes on consumer choice. These indicate that online shopping is
well suited for functional products about which online stores can provide detailed information. However,
online stores are less suited for products with sensory “touch and feel” attributes. Brown and Goolsbee
(2002) use data on individual insurance policies to analyze the impact of comparison shopping on offline
prices. They find that the introduction of the insurance-oriented web sites was at first associated with high
price dispersion. As the use of these sites became more widespread, prices and dispersion fall. Sengupta
and Wiggins (2006) find that increased online sales of airline tickets are associated with reduced online
and offline prices. Lal and Sarvary (1999) distinguish between digital and non-digital product attributes.
Digital attributes can be conveyed via the internet, while non-digital attributes can only be judged in per-
son at a retail store. The introduction of online shopping may induce consumers not to search, but instead
to order familiar products online. In turn, this increased consumer loyalty can induce firms to raise prices.
The paper is structured as follows. We next present the formal model. In Section 3.3, we present
results of a numerical analysis that allows us to explore the equilibrium product variety, quality and pric-
ing strategy of the store along with the changes in its customer base and profits that ensue as it adapts
to increasing competition from online retailers. The last section concludes the paper.
3.2 The Model
Our economy features a single brick and mortar (b&m) store that has a physical establishment, and many
competitive electronic retailers that sell products on the internet. These stores differ in three ways: (1) it
is costly for consumers to travel to the b&m store, but internet “transportation” costs are zero; (2) online
purchases are imperfect and inferior substitutes for purchases from the b&m store reflecting that online
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deliveries take time and may require inconvenient and possibly flawed self-installation; and (3) there is a
fixed cost k > 0 of having a physical establishment, but maintaining an internet presence is costless.
Consumers differ from each other in two ways: (1) their distances x from the b&m store; and (2)
their valuations θ of product quality which are uniformly distributed over [a, b]. Consumer location and
quality valuation are independently distributed in the population. In addition, all consumers incur utility
losses of (1− δ)θq from online purchases.
A consumer who travels distance x to the b&m store incurs costs tx, where t > 0. A consumer with
quality valuation θ and online discount factor δ derives utility θq from purchasing a product of quality q
from the b&m store, but he only derives utility δθq, if he buys online. In this paper we primarily focus
on how the degree δm ∈ (0, 1) with which online purchase retain their value relative to in-store purchases
for these consumers influences the price quality offers at the b&m store.
A consumer knows his distance x from the b&m store, and the utility costs associated with his online
purchases, but he does not learn his valuation of quality unless he goes to a store and inspects the prod-
ucts. A consumer can (1) buy a product online at the outset without knowing his valuation, or (2) visit
a store, learn his valuation, and then decide which product, if any, to buy at the b&m store or online.
It costs cq2 to produce a good of quality q, where c > 0. The b&m store chooses the level and
variety of its product qualities, and their prices. Note that if the b&m store sells both qualities q∗h and q∗l ,
then it has to concern itself about the possibility that a high quality valuation customer may buy the low
quality good whenever the price difference ph − pl is large. That is, the b&m store has to worry about
the competition provided by its own product quality line. Electronic retailers are perfectly competitive,
implying that a consumer can buy online a good of any quality q at a price of cq.
3.2.1 Monopoly
We first consider a benchmark setting where online purchases are not a viable alternative for con-
sumers so that the b&m store operates as a monopolist. Now, suppose the b&m store sells two product
qualities ql and qh, ql < qh at associated prices pl < ph. Further, suppose consumers with valuations
θ ∈ [g, h] buy the low quality product while consumers with valuations θ ∈ [k, l] buy the high quality
product. Since consumers with a higher valuation value quality more, the quality choices made by any
two valuation types is non decreasing in θ. To see this, note that given a choice between qi and qj , qi > qj ,
a consumer of type θ purchases qj only if θ(qi−qj)− 12 (q2i −q2j ) < pi−pj . The larger is θ, the greater is the
reduction in price required to induce a consumer to purchase the lower quality. Hence, it is impossible to
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induce a higher type consumer to purchase a lower quality than a lower type. Further, since a consumer’s
payoff is increasing in θ, it follows that a ≤ g < h = k < l = b.
Self selection by consumers means that for type θ ∈ [h, b] consumers to purchase qh and type θ ∈ [g, h]
consumers to purchase ql, the following incentive compatibility constraints must hold:
θ(qh − ql)− (ph − pl) ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [g, h]
θ(qh − ql)− (ph − pl) ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [h, b].
Further, the individual rationality constraint for consumers who buy the low quality product, θql − pl ≥
0 ∀ θ ∈ [g, h], must hold.
Then, the expected utility of a consumer who visits the b&m store, inspects the products and decides
which, if any, to buy is
piM =
1
t
[∫ h
g
(θql − pl)f(θ) dθ +
∫ b
h
(θqh − ph)f(θ) dθ
]
×
[∫ h
g
(pl − cq2l )f(θ) dθ +
∫ b
h
(ph − cq2h)f(θ) dθ
]
− k.
Since consumer valuations are uniformly distributed over [a, b], the above reduces to
piM =
1
(b− a)2t
[∫ h
g
(θql − pl) dθ +
∫ b
h
(θqh − ph) dθ
]
× [(h− g)(pl − cq2l ) + (b− h)(ph − cq2h)]− k.
3.2.2 Internet Competition
We now assume that online purchases are plausible alternatives for some consumers so that electronic
retailers operate.
A consumer located at a distance x from the b&m store can buy the product online at the outset
without knowing his quality valuation, or he can visit the b&m store where he learns his valuation. Once
he has learnt his valuation, he can opt to buy the product at the b&m store, or return and buy it online,
if at all. If he buys online at the outset, marginal cost pricing on the part of electronic retailers implies
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that his quality choice solves
max
q
δ
∫ b
a
θqf(θ) dθ − cq2.
Hence, he purchases online a good of quality
q = δ(b+ a)4c
obtaining an expected payoff of δ
2(b+a)2
16c . A consumer who buys online after learning θ purchases a good
of quality
q(θ) = δθ2c ,
obtaining a payoff of δ2θ24c .
Now, suppose, as before that consumers with valuations θ ∈ [g, h] buy the low quality product, those
with valuations θ ∈ [j, k] buy the high quality product while the rest buy the product online. Then, a
consumer’s expected payoff from visiting a store is
∫ h
g
(θql − pl)f(θ) dθ +
∫ k
j
(θqh − ph)f(θ) dθ +
∫ g
a
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ +
∫ j
h
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ
+
∫ b
k
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ −
δ2(a+ b)2
16c − tx
so that the store draws consumers over a distance
1
t
[∫ h
g
(θql − pl)f(θ) dθ +
∫ k
j
(θqh − ph)f(θ) dθ +
∫ g
a
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ +
∫ j
h
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ
+
∫ b
k
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ −
δ2(a+ b)2
16c
]
.
Thus, the expected profits of the store are
piI = 1
t
[∫ h
g
(θql − pl)f(θ) dθ +
∫ k
j
(θqh − ph)f(θ) dθ +
∫ g
a
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ
+
∫ j
h
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ +
∫ b
k
δ2θ2
4c f(θ) dθ −
δ2(a+ b)2
16c
]
×
[(
h− g
b− a
)
(pl − cq2l ) +
(
k − j
b− a
)
(ph − cq2h)
]
− k
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and it maximizes profits subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. For
consumers buying at the store, these are
θql − pl − δ
2θ2
4c ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [g, h]
θqh − ph − δ
2θ2
4c ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [j, k]
θ(qh − ql)− (ph − pl) ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [g, h]
θ(qh − ql)− (ph − pl) ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ [j, k].
3.3 Numerical Analysis
Below, we present results from a numerical analysis of the model for different parametric specifications.
We explore the price quality offer, the consumer valuation types targeted for each of its products, profits
as well as the number of consumers visiting and buying at the store as a function of the discount factor.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict the price and quality of the high and low quality product offered at the store
for different levels of the discount factor.
Figure 3.1: Price and Quality of the high quality product as a function of the discount factor. Parameters:
t = 1, c = 3, a = 2, b = 8
As the discount factor increases, online products become increasingly better substitutes of those of-
fered at the store as waiting costs decrease and prices offered online are more competitive. Hence, there
is an incentive for consumers, especially for those with a low valuation of quality, to switch to online
purchases. In order to prevent this move, the brick and mortar store lowers the prices while maintaining
nearly the same quality of its products. When online competition is modest, this induces more and more
consumers (with increasingly lower valuations) to buy at the store. This is depicted in the first panel of
Figure 3.3 which shows the highest valuation type that buys the low and high quality product respectively
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Figure 3.2: Price and Quality of the low quality product as a function of the discount factor. Parameters:
t = 1, c = 3, a = 2, b = 8
as a function of the discount factor. For instance, as long as they are located near enough, when δ = 1/2,
consumers of valuation type θ ∈ [2, 3.15] buy the product online after visiting the store, while those of
type θ ∈ [3.15, 5.58] buy the low quality product at the store. Consumers of type θ ∈ [5.58, 8] buy the high
quality product at the store. Thus, we observe that as the discount factor rises and online competition
intensifies, the store initially is able to offer its low quality product to consumers with increasingly low
valuations. This, in turn, results in more and more consumers with relatively high valuations switching
to the low quality product, as shown in the second panel of Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Valuation types targeted by the store for its low and high quality product as a function of the discount factor.
Parameters: t = 1, c = 3, a = 2, b = 8
However, when the discount factor is relatively high, implying that online products are nearly perfect
substitutes, the store is unable to match the offers online any further. Consequently, consumers with
very low valuations switch to online products. The low quality product offered is now catered towards
consumers with relatively higher valuations than before. Consequently, as the store is now able to extract
the higher willingness to pay of these consumers with a higher valuation, the quality of the low quality
product increases sharply as does its price. The incentive compatibility constraint for consumers with
relatively high valuations dictates that in order to ensure that they continue to purchase the high quality
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product, the quality of the high quality product and its price increase (as does the lowest valuation type
who purchases the high quality product).
The number of consumers visiting and buying at the store both decrease as the discount factor in-
crease as shown in Figure 3.4; this likely reflects the increasing reservation payoff of consumers who now
derive a higher payoff than before from buying the product online at the outset. Profits of the store decline
too as its consumer base declines along with the prices it can charge for its products (Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.4: Consumers visiting and buying at the store as a function of the discount factor. Parameters:
t = 1, c = 3, a = 2, b = 8.
Figure 3.5: Profits of the store as a function of the discount factor. Parameters: t = 1, c = 3, a = 2, b = 8.
The impact of a lower cost parameter is primarily to increase the prices charged and the quality
levels of the products offered by the store, as expected (Figures 3.6 and 3.7).
Figure 3.8 depicts the impact of an increase in the travel cost parameter t. We find that an increase
in travel costs has no bearing on the prices and quality offered or the valuation types targeted; its only
impact is to lower the number of consumers visiting (and buying) at the store as well as its profits.
When the support of consumer valuation types is small, i.e. consumers do not differ largely in their
valuation of quality, we find that prices decline as δ increases with constant quality levels, for the following
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Figure 3.6: Price and Quality of the high quality product as a function of the discount factor when marginal costs are low.
Parameters: t = 1, c = 12 , a = 2, b = 8.
Figure 3.7: Price and Quality of the low quality product as a function of the discount factor when marginal costs are low.
Parameters: t = 1, c = 12 , a = 2, b = 8.
Figure 3.8: Consumer base and profits of the store as a function of the discount factor, for high and low travel costs.
Parameters: c = 12 , a = 2, b = 8.
reason. Here, the spread of consumer valuations is low so that consumers who buy the low quality prod-
uct have relatively similar valuations (than when the spread is high) and analogously for the high quality
product. Hence, the store is able to cater more closely to the tastes of all its consumers; the products
offered at the store are a better match than those available online for all consumers who buy it as long
as the price difference is not too high. Consequently, even when online competition intensifies, the store
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continues to cater to the same set of consumer valuation types and offers the same qualities, albeit at
steadily declining prices (see Figure 3.9, 3.10). Profits decline as δ increases, for similar reasons as in the
above cases, as shown in Figure 3.11.
Figure 3.9: Price and quality of the high quality product when the support of consumer valuation types is small as a
function of the discount factor. Parameters: t = 1, c = 12 , a = 2, b = 3.
Figure 3.10: Price and quality of the low quality product when the support of consumer valuation types is small as a
function of the discount factor. Parameters: t = 1, c = 12 , a = 2, b = 3.
Figure 3.11: Profits of the store when the support of consumer valuation types is small as a function of the discount factor.
Parameters: t = 1, c = 12 , a = 2, b = 3.
Finally, we study the behavior of the model under monopoly. The following table summarizes the
results under different parametric specifications. As expected, the price and quality levels are nearly iden-
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Parameter values Prices Qualities
t = 1, a = 2, b = 3, c = 12 ph = 5.3593, pl = 4.1093 qh = 2.75, ql = 2.25
t = 1, a = 2, b = 8, c = 12 ph = 28.16, pl = 10.24 qh = 6.4, ql = 3.2
t = 1, a = 2, b = 8, c = 3 ph = 4.693, pl = 1.7066 qh = 1.0667, ql = 0.5333
Table 3.1: Equilibrium Prices and Qualities under Monopoly
tical to the equilibrium qualities and prices in the internet setting when the discount factor δ is very low,
implying that when the discounted payoff from online purchases is very low, the store effectively operates
as a monopoly.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper explores numerically how the strategy choices of product variety, quality and pricing by a
brick and mortar store are influenced by stiffening online competition when consumer valuation types are
continuous. When the support of consumer valuations of quality is high, the store initially offers products
of nearly the same quality at increasingly lower prices as the discount factor increases. This move initially
lures consumers with very low valuations to buy at the store when online competition is low. However, as
it intensifies, the store is unable to match the competitive offers online and quits catering to those with
very low valuations; the latter switch to online purchases. Instead, its products now cater to consumers
with relatively higher valuations than before, i.e. the quality of its products increases. All the while, the
store witnesses a steady decline in profits as the number of consumers who visit and buy at the store
decreases along with the prices it charges for some of its products.
A decrease in marginal costs is found to increase the quality and prices of products while an increase
in the travel costs is found to decrease the number of consumers visiting and buy at the store and its
profits only, while leaving other strategy choices of product variety, quality and pricing unchanged. Lastly,
when the support of consumer valuations is very small, the store offers the same quality to the same set
of consumer types at increasingly lower prices. This is because when the spread of consumer valuations
is low, consumers who buy either of the two products have relatively similar valuations (than when the
spread is high). Hence, the products are a better match than those available online for all consumers
who buy it as long as the price difference is not too high. Consequently, even when online competition
intensifies, the store continues to cater to the same set of consumer valuation types and offers the same
qualities at steadily declining prices.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. The b&m store’s expected profits are
piM =
2
t
[
λ
(
θhqh − 12q
2
h − ph
)
+ (1− λ)
(
θlql − 12q
2
l − pl
)]
(λ(ph − cqh) + (1− λ)(pl − cql))− k.
Differentiating with respect to ph, pl, qh, ql and solving for the optimal price-quality offers reveals that
quality provision is always efficient, q∗l = θl− c and q∗h = θh− c. However, there is a continuum of optimal
price offers, where the high quality good’s price is indexed by p∗l :
p∗h =
λ(θh + c)2 + (1− λ)(θl + c)2 − 4c2
4λ −
(1− λ)p∗l
λ
≡ f(p∗l ).
Each price pair, (p∗l , f(p∗l )) induces the same expected expenditures by consumers. It is this payment that
enters travel decisions of the marginal consumer x∗, and the store’s maximized profits:
pi∗M =
(λ(θh − c)2 + (1− λ)(θl − c)2)2
8t − k.
Note that p∗h and p∗l are inversely related, where the slope, − (1−λ)λ , reflects the tradeoff between the two
required to support constant consumer expenditure and profit.
At an optimum, all constraints must be slack. The incentive compatibility constraint for high valu-
ation types bounds p∗l from below:
p∗l ≥
λ(θh − θl)(3θl − θh − 2c) + (θl + c)2 − 4c2
4 .
So, too, the two constraints for low types place an upper bound:
p∗l ≤ min
(
λ(θh − θl)(3θh − θl − 2c) + (θl + c)2 − 4c2
4 ,
θ2l − c2
2
)
.
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These bounds are simply the prices of the low quality good corresponding to optima where one constraint
holds at equality. When the incentive compatibility constraint for the high valuation type holds with
equality, it is easy to solve for
pIChl =
λ(θh − θl)(3θl − θh − 2c) + (θl + c)2 − 4c2
4 ,
pIChh = p
ICh
l +
(θh − θl)(2c+ θh − θl)
2 .
The individual rationality constraint for the low type is satisfied, as
θlql − 12q
2
l − pl = θl (θl − c)−
1
2 (θl − c)
2 − (θl − c)(3c+ θl) + λ(θh − θl)(3θl − θh − 2c)4
= 14
(
(3λ+ 1)θ2l − θl(2c+ 2cλ+ 4λθh) + c2 + 2cλθh + λθ2h)
)
> 0,
since it is a positive quadratic in θl. Hence, pl = pIChl .
Now, define ρ(λ, c) as the larger root of
3λ(θh − θl)2 + 2λ(θl − c)(θh − θl)− (θl − c)2 = 0,
where
ρ(λ, c) = (θl − c)
−1 +
√
1 + 3λ
3
 .
Note that ρ(λ, c) decreases in λ. It is easy to show that if θh − θl ≤ ρ(λ, c), the incentive compatibility
constraint for the low valuation type holds at the optimum, with associated prices:
pICll =
λ(θh − θl)(3θh − θl − 2c) + (θl + c)2 − 4c2
4 ,
pIClh = p
ICl
l +
(θh − θl) (2c− θh + θl)
2 .
The individual rationality constraint for low valuation types is satisfied if
θlql − 12q
2
l − pl = θl (θl − c)−
1
2 (θl − c)
2 − (θl − c)(3c+ θl) + λ(θh − θl)(3θh − θl − 2c)4
= −3λ(θh − θl)2 − 2λ(θl − c)(θh − θl) + (θl − c)2 > 0,
which always holds as long as θh − θl ≤ ρ(λ, c). Here, p¯l = pICll .
Finally, if θh − θl > ρ(λ, c), the individual rationality constraint for the low type holds. When the
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individual rationality constraint holds at equality, one can solve for
pIRll =
θ2l − c2
2 ,
pIRlh = p
IRl
l +
λ(θh − θl)(θh + θl + 2c)− (θl − c)2
4λ .
The incentive compatibility constraint for the low type holds since
θl(ql − qh)− 12(q
2
l − q2h)− (pl − ph) = 3λ(θh − θl)2 + 2λ(θl − c)(θh − θl)− (θl − c)2 > 0
for θh − θl > ρ(λ, c). Here, p¯l = pIRll .
To see that no constraint binds, suppose (for example) by way of contradiction that a constraint for
only the low type binds. Then one can reduce the price of the low quality good (and raise that of the
high quality good) in such a manner that all constraints are now slack and revenues are unchanged, a
contradiction of the premise that the constraint was binding. 
Proof of Proposition 2. That equilibrium pricing and quality provision corresponds to the monopoly
outcome whenever δm is sufficiently small (save for the loss of computer-literate consumers who reduce op-
erating profits by µ1%) is almost immediate. When δm ≤ cE[θ] , consumers do not buy online at the outset,
so the objective function under internet competition is a linear transformation of that under monopoly,
i.e., piI = (µ0 +µm)piM , and the IR constraints are identical too, whenever δm ≤ cθh . Hence, for δm ≤ cθh ,
all properties extend.
However, once δm > cθh , the right-hand side of IRh is non-zero. As a result, the continuum of price
offers that can be supported as internet equilibria eventually begins to shrink progressively with increases
in δm. We now calculate explicitly when this occurs. Recall from Proposition 1 that ICh holds at point
A in Figure 1.1. The IRh constraint evaluated at A,
1
4
(
(θh − c)2 − (1− λ)(θh − θl)(2c+ θh − 3θl)
)− (δmθh − c)22δm ≥ 0,
is satisfied for δm ∈ ( cθh , δ˜m), where δ˜m is the larger root of
1
4
(
(θh − c)2 − (1− λ)(θh − θl)(2c+ θh − 3θl)
)− (δmθh − c)22δm = 0.
Therefore, for δm ∈ ( cθh , δ˜m), A can be supported in equilibrium. Further, since equilibrium monopoly
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quality provision is efficient everywhere on the continuum, θhq∗h − q
∗2
h
2 − p∗h − (δmθh−c)
2
2δm rises as p
∗
h falls
along the continuum from A to B. Therefore, if the constraint holds at A for some δm, it holds at all
points on the continuum. If δ˜m ≥ cE[θ] , then for all δm ≤ cE[θ] , the entire continuum can be supported as
equilibria under internet competition. Here δ∗m = cE[θ] .
If instead, δ˜m < cE[θ] , the subset of the continuum that can be supported as equilibria decreases
in δm: as δm rises above δ˜m, the individual rationality constraint is violated at A. In particular, at any
δm > δ˜m, any ph > ph(δm) and pl < pl(δm) = f−1(ph(δm)) on the continuum can no longer be supported,
where ph solves
θhq
∗
h −
q∗2h
2 − ph −
(δmθh − c)2
2δm
= 0.
Substituting for q∗h = θh − c and solving the above equation for ph yields ph = θ
2
h−c2
2 − (δmθh−c)
2
2δm . Note
that pl(δm) increases in δm. Thus, the continuum begins to shrink and collapses either to B, or to a range
of offers pl ∈ [f−1(ph), p¯l], where p¯l is the price offer at point B and ph = θ
2
h−c2
2 − c(θh−θl)
2(1−λ)2
2E[θ] solves
the individual rationality constraint for the high type at δm = cE[θ] :
θ2h − c2
2 −
c(θh − θl)2(1− λ)2
2E[θ] − ph = 0.
In the more interesting case where quality valuations are not too different, i.e., when θh−θl ≤ ρ(λ, c),
from Proposition 1, the incentive compatibility constraint for low types holds at B. Now, the individual
rationality constraint for the high type evaluated at B,
1
4
(
(θh − c)2 − (1− λ)(θh − θl)(2c− 3θh + θl)
)− (δmθh − c)22δm ≥ 0
is strictly positive for δm = cE[θ] . Therefore, the continuum shrinks to a range of price offers, pl ∈
[f−1(ph), pICll ] at δm = cE[θ] . Here, δ∗m =
c
E[θ] .
Lastly, since these results hold for δm ≤ cE[θ] , the expected profits of the b&m store at the equilibrium,
pi∗I , equal (µ0 + µm)pi∗M , where pi∗M is its equilibrium profit under monopoly.
Next consider δm > cE[θ] . Now, prior to consumers learning their valuations, online purchases at the
outset have a positive value: their reservation utility rises to (δmE[θ]−c)
2
2δm . This reduces how far consumers
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are willing to travel to the store. Equation (1.1) becomes:
piI =
2
t
(
(µ0 + µm)
(
λ(θhqh − q
2
h
2 − ph) + (1− λ)(θlql −
q2l
2 − pl)
)
− µm (δmE[θ]− c)
2
2δm
)
× (λ(ph − cqh) + (1− λ)(pl − cql))− k.
(A.1)
Differentiating equation (A.1) with respect to ph, pl, qh and ql and solving the first-order conditions for
the unconstrained optimal price quality offer gives q∗l = θl − c, q∗h = θh − c and a continuum of inversely-
related prices, p∗h = g(p∗l ), where g′ = − 1−λλ < 0. Profits decrease in δm as the number of consumers who
visit the b&m store and the profits, P , from a representative consumer both fall:
dN
dδm
= −µm
(
(δmθl − c) + δmλ(θh − θl)
)(
δmθl + c+ δmλ(θh − θl)
)
2tδ2m
< 0,
dP
dδm
= −µm
(
(δmθl − c) + δmλ(θh − θl)
)(
δmθl + c+ δmλ(θh − θl)
)
4δ2m(µ0 + µm)
< 0.
At an interior optimum, all constraints must be slack. The incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints for the low types remain slack if
(θl − θh + 2c)
(
θh − θl
2
)
− (p∗h − p∗l ) < 0 and
θ2l − c2
2 − 1δm> cθl
(δmθl − c)2
2δm
− p∗l > 0.
Since p∗h decreases in p∗l , these two constraints set upper bounds for interior solutions on p∗l of the form
p∗l < min(p∗1l , p∗2l ). The analogous constraints for high types
(θh − θl + 2c)
(
θh − θl
2
)
− (p∗h − p∗l ) > 0 and
θ2h − c2
2 −
(δmθh − c)2
2δm
− p∗h > 0
set a lower bound on p∗l of the form p∗l > max(p∗3l , p∗4l ). The prices, (p∗1l , p∗2l , p∗3l , p∗4l ), that constitute
these bounds are the prices of the low quality good that prevail at an equilibrium when only one constraint
holds with equality at the optimum. These bounds may be restated as pl(δm) = max(pIChl , p
IRh
l ) < p∗l <
min(pICll , p
IRl
l ) = p¯l(δm).
The inequality, max(pIChl , p
IRh
l ) < p∗l < min(p
ICl
l , p
IRl
l ), sheds light on which constraints hold at
equality at any δm, and thus on how the continuum of equilibrium price pairs (with its “length” determined
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by the two bounds) evolves as online competition intensifies. First observe that pIRhl − pIChl rises in δm:
d
dδm
(pIRhl − pIChl ) > 0⇐⇒
= δ2mµm (θh − θl)
(
θh(1− λ2) + θl(1− λ)2
)
+ (δ2mθ2h − c2)(2µ0 + µm) > 0.
Next note that when θl is close to θh and δm = cE[θ] , p
IRl
l − pICll → (θh−c)
2
4 > 0 so that min(p
ICl
l , p
IRl
l ) =
pICll , i.e., ICl holds at equality. Further, as θl → θh, ddδm (p
IRl
l − pICll ) < 0 when δm > cθl , i.e., when
quality valuations are not too different and the discount factor is high enough, as δm rises, IRl begins
to hold at equality at a higher discount factor. Lastly, pIRll − pICll , rises in θl when δm → cE[θ] : when
valuations are relatively different, IRl holds with equality at a lower θl. Thus, when the valuations are
not too different and the discount factor is relatively low, the incentive compatibility constraint for high
types holds with equality at the left end of the continuum, with the incentive compatibility constraint for
low types holding at the other end, i.e. pl(δm) = pIChl and p¯l(δm) = p
ICl
l .
We now show that as δm rises past cE(θ) , the “length” of this continuum of supporting equilibrium
price pairs eventually falls in δm. To see this, note that
dpIChl
dδm
= dp
ICl
l
dδm
= dp
ICh
h
dδm
= −µm(δmE(θ)− c)(δmE(θ) + c)4δ2m(µ0 + µm)
< 0,
so the length of the continuum, given by pICll − pIChl , is unaffected by increases in δm. Since the slope
of the continuum, g′ = − 1−λλ , is independent of δm, the continuum undergoes a parallel shift (since the
slope is unchanged) below (since pIChh decreases) to the left (since p
ICh
l , p
ICl
l both decrease) as δm rises.
This continues until either:
Case I: IRl begins to hold with equality before IRh. Then this occurs at δm = δ1m where δ1m solves
pICll − pIRll = 0. Note that δ1m > cθl . This is because as long as δm < cθl , then solving IRL viz.
θlq
∗
l − q
∗2
l
2 − pl = 0 for pIRLl yields pIRLl = (θ
2
l−c2)
2 . Since p
IRL
l − pICLl > 0 and pIRLl does not vary with
δm, but pICLl decreases, it follows that p
IRL
l − pICLl increases in δm for δm ∈ ( cE[θ] , cθl ]. However, once
δm >
c
θl
, pIRll also decreases in δm with derivative − δ
2
mθ
2
l−c2
2δ2m
.
It then follows that the continuum of equilibrium price pairs shrinks if and only if ddδm (p
IRl
l −pIChl ) <
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0. To begin, one can show that
dpIRll
dδm
− dp
ICh
l
dδm
< 0
⇐⇒ 2c2µ0 + c2µm − δ2m
(
θ2l
(
2µ0 + µm
)
− λµm
(
θh − θl
)(
λ(θh − θl) + 2θl
))
< 0.
(A.2)
Inspection of inequality (A.2) reveals that if it is negative at any δm, then it continues to be so with
further increases in δm. The inequality holds at δm = δ1m as
dp
IRl
l
dδm
− dp
ICh
l
dδm
= −λ
(
dp
IRl
h
dδm
− dp
IRl
l
dδm
)
< 0. To
see that ddδm (p
IRl
h − pIRll ) > 0 at δm = δ1m, recall that for δm = δ1m, the relevant constraint determining
the upper bound on pl switches from ICl to IRl. Since, pIRll = p
ICl
l and p
IRl
h = p
ICl
h at δm = δ1m, it
follows that pIRlh − pIRll = pIClh − pICll = θl(q∗h − q∗l )− 12 (q∗2h − q∗2l ). However, as δm rises further (and lies
in the upper neighborhood of δ1m), pIRlh − pIRll > θl(q∗h − q∗l ) − 12 (q∗2h − q∗2l ) (a constant independent of
δm). Thus, it must be that
dp
IRl
h
dδm
− dp
IRl
l
dδm
> 0 at δm = δ1m and consequently
dp
IRl
l
dδm
− dp
ICh
l
dδm
< 0. But if so,
then inequality (A.2) implies that this must hold for all δm > δ1m.
Thus, as δm increases, pIRll − pIChl decreases. Now, let δ2m solve pIChl − pIRhl = 0 and let δ`m solve
pIChl −pIRll = 0. If δ`m < δ2m, then pIRll −pIChl shrinks to zero at δ`m where the IRl, ICh bind (here, δm(θl) =
δ`m). However, if δ2m < δ`m, then ICh slackens and IRh begins to hold at the left end, when δm = δ2m. Now,
dpIRll
dδm
− dp
IRh
l
dδm
= −2µ1
(
δ2λ
(
θ2h − θ2l
)
+ δ2θ2l − c2
)
4δ2m(1− λ)(µ0 + µm)
− µ2
(
δ2λ (θh − θl) ((2− λ) θh + λθl) + δ2θ2l − c2
)
4δ2m(1− λ)(µ0 + µm)
< 0
since δm > cθl , so that the continuum shrinks with increases in δm until it collapses to a point at δm = δ´m
where δ´m solves pIRll = p
IRh
l . The two individual rationality constraints now begin to bind (here δm = δ´m)
and quality provision is efficient. Note that the incentive compatibility constraint for high types places a
lower bound on δm at which an equilibrium where the two individual rationality constraints bind can be
supported:
θhq
∗
h −
1
2q
∗2
h − p∗h − (θlq∗l −
1
2q
∗2
l − p∗l ) =
1
2(θh − θl)(2θh − δmθh − δmθl) > 0
as long as δm > 2θlθh+θl .
Case II: IRh holds with equality before IRl. Then, IRh holds at equality at the left end of the con-
tinuum and ICl holds at the other end. As above, one can establish that the length of the continuum,
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pICll − pIRhl , decreases with δm. As δm rises, the continuum collapses to a point where either (1) ICl and
IRh bind or (2) IRl begins to hold with equality rather than ICl (so that the relevant bounds on pl now
are pIRhl , p
IRl
l ). We analyzed case (2) earlier. We now show that case (1) can never arise. Suppose, by way
of contradiction, that the continuum indeed collapses where the ICl and IRh constraints bind. Then, first
order conditions yield q∗l = θl − c, q∗h < θh − c. But by increasing q∗h, the store can appropriate the entire
increase in surplus, θhq∗h− 12q∗2h − cq∗h, in the form of a higher p∗h− cq∗h, increasing profits, a contradiction.
Similarly, when the valuations are relatively different, ICh and IRl hold with equality at the two
ends of the continuum when δm is low. One can show that the continuum begins to shrink once δm is
high enough, and as before, the two cases discussed earlier obtain.
Thus, as δm rises, the continuum shrinks to a point at δm(θl), where either the two individual ratio-
nality constraints bind, or ICh binds along with IRl. Now, let θ¯l(θh) solve pIChl = p
IRh
l = p
IRl
l . Recall
that for the two individual rationality constraints to bind δm > 2θlθh+θl , or equivalently, θl <
δmθh
2−δm . One
can again show that ICh and IRl cannot bind when δm > 2θlθh+θl , or equivalently, θl <
δmθh
2−δm . Define
δmθh
2−δ
m
= θ¯l. Thus, ICh and IRl bind at the optimum at δm(θl) for θl > θ¯l, i.e., when the valuations are
not too different. The two individual rationality constraints bind otherwise.
Once multiple constraints begin to bind, and tighten progressively with increases in δm, the store’s
expected profits keep declining: these new price quality offers were feasible at lower values of δm but were
suboptimal (else they would have been offered). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that at δm = δm, ICh and IRl bind when the valuations are relatively
close. Solving the first-order conditions yields q∗h = θh − c, q∗l < θl − c.
Now, a slack individual rationality constraint for the high type implies
θhq
∗
h −
1
2q
∗2
h −
(δmθh − c)2
2δm
− p∗h =
1
2(θh − θl)(2c+ 2q
∗
l − δm(θh + θl)) > 0.
This holds as long as q∗l > δm2 (θh + θl)− c. But then θl − c > q∗l > δm2 (θh + θl)− c⇒ δm < 2θlθh+θl i.e., the
constraint is violated if δm ≥ 2θlθh+θl . Then, by continuity, there exists a δ¯m < 2θlθh+θl such that for δm > δ¯m,
at the optimum, ICh and IRl do not both bind.
In fact, for δm ∈ [δ¯m, 2θlθh+θl ], if the store offers two qualities, the two rationality constraints and the
incentive compatibility constraint for the high type bind, with q∗h = θh − c, q∗l = δm(θh+θl)2 − c, and prices
pinned down by the two IR constraints. When λ → 1, if the store offers two qualities with the above
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mentioned constraints binding, its equilibrium profits are
pi = µ0(1− δm)(δmθh − c)
2(δmθ2h − c2)
2tδ2m
− k.
In contrast, if the store offers a single product to the high type only, it sets q∗ = θh−c, and earns expected
profits of
pi = (δmµ0(θh − c)
2 + (1− δm)µm(δmθ2h − c2))2
8tδ2m(µ0 + µm)
− k
when λ→ 1. It is easy to show that the latter is strictly higher. Then, by continuity of the profit function
in λ (and θl), there exists a λ¯(θl) ∈ (0, 1) such that for all λ ∈ [λ¯(θl), 1], offering a single product is
optimal. Further, one can show that profits decrease in δm.
By continuity of the profit function in δm, there exists a δˆ1m(θl, λ) ≤ δ¯m, such that for λ ∈ [λ¯(θl), 1],
further increases in δm beyond δˆ1m(θl, λ) result in the b&m store switching to a single product offer. Sim-
ilarly, note that as δm rises above 2θlθh+θl , only the two individual rationality constraints bind. This is
optimal for the b&m store as the surplus from either valuation type is maximized and there is no in-store
product line competition. Then, by continuity, there exists a δˆ2m(θl) = 2θlθh+θl , δˆ
2′
m(θl) > 0, such that for
δm > δˆ
2
m, the b&m store reverts to offering two socially optimal qualities.
Finally, we derive a lower bound on θl such that the result holds. Note that the two IR constraints
bind for δm ∈ [max(δm, 2θlθh+θl ), 1), or equivalently, for θl < δmθh2−δm when δm ≥ δm. ICh binds with one or
more individual rationality constraints when δm ≥ δm and θl > δmθh2−δm . Hence, there exists a θˆl, such that
for δm > δm and θl ≥ θˆl ≥ δmθh2−δm , the result holds. 
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Appendix B
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5. Suppose candidate i wins the primary. The probability he defeats the
incumbent in the general election is
Pri1 =
Z¯i2
Z¯i2 + Z¯I2
=
Z¯i1
(1+pi1)α
(1+ρnI1)α
Z¯i1
(1+pi1)α
(1+ρnI1)α + X¯I
(1+pI1)α
(1+ρni1)α
= a[(1 + pi1)
α(1 + ρni1)α]/b
a[(1 + pi1)α(1 + ρni1)α]/b+ 1
.
where a and b are positive constants outside of candidate i’s control at t = 1. Candidate i maximizes the
probability of winning the general election by maximizing
max
pi1,ni1
(1 + pi1)α(1 + ρni1)α subject to pi1 + ni1 ≤ B¯i − (pi0 + ni0) ≡ Bi1, pi1, ni1 ≥ 0,
where Bi1 denotes the funds at his disposal for campaigning in the general election. Since the probability
of winning increases in both pi1, ni1, the constraint binds, i.e., pi1 + ni1 = Bi1. Thus, i’s maximization
problem reduces to
max
pi1,ni1
(1 + pi1)α(1 + ρni1)α subject to pi1 + ni1 = Bi1, pi1, ni1 ≥ 0.
Hence, the challenger’s optimal choices of negative and positive campaigning are
p∗i1 =

Bi1
2 − ρ−12ρ , if ρ− 1− ρBi1 ≤ 0
0, if ρ− 1− ρBi1 > 0
and n∗i1 =

Bi1
2 +
ρ−1
2ρ , if ρ− 1− ρBi1 ≤ 0
Bi1, if ρ− 1− ρBi1 > 0.
Similarly, the incumbent’s campaigning solves
max
pI1,nI1
(1 + pI1)α(1 + ρnI1)α subject to pI1 + nI1 = B¯I , pI1, nI1 ≥ 0,
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with solution
n∗I1 =
ρ− 1
2ρ +
B¯I
2 and p
∗
I1 =
B¯I
2 −
ρ− 1
2ρ
if B¯I > ρ−1ρ and n∗I1 = B¯I if B¯I ≤ ρ−1ρ .
The probability candidate i wins the primary is Pri0 = Z¯i0Z¯i0+Z¯j0 , and since he only cares about
winning the general election, he chooses pi0 and ni0 to maximize
pii = (MiPri1 − Prj1)Pri0 + Prj1.
To ease presentation, define Pit = 1+pit andNit = 1+ρnit where t ∈ {0, 1}, and letQ∗i0 = X¯j(P
∗
j0N
∗
j0)
α
X¯i(P∗i0N∗i0)α
, Q∗i1 =
X¯I(P∗I N
∗
I (1−β+βN∗j0))α
X¯i(P∗i1N∗i1(1−β+βP∗i0))α
, with analogous expressions for j. Suppose that the challenger’s resources are high
enough that he engages in both negative and positive campaigning in the general election. Then, at an
interior optimum, his primary campaigning choices (N∗i0, P ∗i0) satisfy the first-order conditions:
∂pii
∂Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1)∂Pri0
∂Ni0
+ Pri0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
− ∂Prj1
∂Ni0
)
+ ∂Prj1
∂Ni0
=
(
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
αQ∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
− 11 +Q∗i0
(
αMiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αβQ
∗
j1
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
− αβQ
∗
j1
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
= 0,
∂pii
∂Pi0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1)∂Pri0
∂Pi0
+MiPri0
∂Pri1
∂Pi0
=
(
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
αQ∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
1
P ∗i1
− β1− β + βP ∗i0
)
= 0.
After canceling terms on both sides, these first-order conditions simplify to:
(
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
= MiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
βQ∗j1Q
∗
i0
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
(B.1)
and (
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
= MiQ
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
1
P ∗i1
− β1− β + βP ∗i0
)
. (B.2)
Dividing equation (B.2) by (B.1), and then rearranging terms, yields
N∗i0
P ∗i0
(
MiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
βQ∗j1Q
∗
i0
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
= MiQ
∗
i1
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− βMiQ
∗
i1
(1− β + βP ∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)2
.
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Multiplying both sides by P ∗i0 yields
MiQ
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
+ βP
∗
i0
1− β + βP ∗i0
)
+
βN∗i0Q
∗
j1Q
∗
i0
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
= 0. (B.3)
At an interior optimum, n∗i0, p∗i0 > 0, or equivalently N∗i0, P ∗i0 > 1. The second term of equation (B.3) is
positive, so the first grouped term must be negative, and hence
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
< 0⇐⇒ P
∗
i0
N∗i0
>
P ∗i1
N∗i1
= 1
ρ
,
or equivalently,
n∗i0 − p∗i0 < n∗i1 − p∗i1 =
ρ− 1
ρ
.
Note that when primary campaigning has no impact on reputations in the final election, i.e., when β = 0,
then equations (B.1) and (B.2) reduce to
(
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
− MiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
= 0 (B.4)
and (
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
− MiQ
∗
i1
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
= 0. (B.5)
Then, as before, it follows that
P ∗i0
P ∗i1
− N
∗
i0
N∗i1
= 0⇐⇒ P
∗
i0
N∗i0
= P
∗
i1
N∗i1
= 1
ρ
⇐⇒ n∗i0 − p∗i0 = n∗i1 − p∗i1 =
ρ− 1
ρ
. (B.6)
One can show that even when challengers have less resources, so that they only campaign negatively in
the general election, then in the primary, at an interior optimum, ρP ∗i0 = N∗i0 or n∗i0 − p∗i0 = ρ−1ρ . 
Proof of Proposition 6. Omitting the i index on pi, the following equations hold at a symmetric
equilibrium since dNi0dβ =
dNj0
dβ and
dPi0
dβ =
dPj0
dβ :
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
+
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
dNi0
dβ
+
(
∂2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
dPi0
dβ
= 0 (B.7)
and
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
+
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
)
dNi0
dβ
+
(
∂2pi
∂P 2i0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
)
dPi0
dβ
= 0. (B.8)
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Then, from equations (B.7) and (B.8),
dNi0
dβ
=
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂2pi
∂P 2
i0
)
− ∂2pi∂β∂Pi0
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pi∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂2pi∂Pi0∂Ni0
)(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pi∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pi
∂N2
i0
)(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂2pi
∂P 2
i0
) . (B.9)
and
dPi0
dβ
=
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
(
∂2pi
∂Ni02
+ ∂2pi∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
− ∂2pi∂β∂Ni0
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂2pi∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂2pi∂Pi0∂Ni0
)(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pi∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pi
∂N2
i0
)(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂2pi
∂P 2
i0
) . (B.10)
The proof consists of the following steps.
Step 1. We show that as β → 0, ∂2pi∂β∂Ni0 < 0. To see this, note that
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
= ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂β
− ∂Prj1
∂β
)
+ Pri0
(
Mi
∂2Pri1
∂β∂Ni0
− ∂
2Prj1
∂β∂Ni0
)
+ ∂
2Prj1
∂β∂Ni0
.
Then, as β → 0 (so that N∗i0 → ρP ∗i0 from equation (B.6)) and under symmetry (so that P
∗
i0
P∗
i1
→
(Mi−1)(1+Q∗i1)
2MiQ∗i1
— this follows from equation (B.5)) under symmetry by substituting Q∗i0 = Q∗j0 = 1, Q∗i1 =
Q∗j1) at an interior optimum, one can show that
lim
β→0
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
= αQ
∗
i1
2(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
−α(Mi − 1)(N
∗
i0 − P ∗i0)
2N∗i0
− αMi(N
∗
i0 − P ∗i0)(1−Q∗i1)
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)
− 1
)
= −α
2(Mi − 1)(ρ− 1)
4ρ(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αQ
∗
i1
2(1 +Q∗i1)2
< 0.
(B.11)
Step 2. We compare the coefficients of ∂Pi0∂β and
∂Ni0
∂β in equations (B.7) and (B.8) respectively. We show
that the coefficient of ∂Pi0∂β in equation (B.7) and that of
∂Ni0
∂β in equation (B.8) are equal as β → 0. Note
that this follows, if in the limit, ∂2pi∂Pj0∂Ni0 =
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
. Now,
lim
β→0
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1) ∂
2Pri0
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂Pri0
∂Pi0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂Nj0
− ∂Prj1
∂Nj0
)
+Mi
(
∂Pri1
∂Pi0
∂Pri0
∂Nj0
+ Pri0
∂2Pri1
∂Nj0∂Pi0
)
.
Since at a symmetric equilibrium, ∂
2Pri0
∂Nj0∂Pi0
= α
2Q∗i0(1−Q∗i0)
N∗
i0P
∗
i0(1+Q∗i0)3
= 0 while ∂Pri1∂Nj0 ,
∂Pri1
∂Nj0∂Pi0
= 0 as β → 0, it
follows that
lim
β→0
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
= α
2Q∗i1(Mi + 1)
4ρP ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
. (B.12)
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Similarly, as β → 0,
∂2pi
∂Pj0Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1) ∂
2Pri0
∂Pj0∂Ni0
− ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂Prj1
∂Pj0
+Mi
∂Pri0
∂Pj0
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
= (Mi + 1)α
2Q∗i1
4ρP ∗i1P ∗i0(1 +Qi1)2
. (B.13)
Further, we show that the coefficients ∂Pi0∂β and
∂Ni0
∂β are negative. To see this, note that
∂2pi
∂Ni0∂Pi0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1) ∂
2Pri0
∂Ni0∂Pi0
+Mi
∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂Pri1
∂Pi0
+Mi
∂Pri0
∂Pi0
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂Ni0∂Pi0
= − α
2MiQ
∗
i1
4P ∗i0N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− α
2MiQ
∗
i1
4N∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
4N∗i1P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3
= − α
2MiQ
∗
i1
2ρP ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
4ρP ∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
,
(B.14)
as ∂
2Pri0
∂Ni0∂Pi0
= − α2Q∗i0(1−Q∗i0)N∗
i0P
∗
i0(1+Q∗i0)3
= 0 under symmetry. Therefore, as β → 0 from equations (B.12), (B.13)
and (B.14),
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
= ∂
2pii
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
= −(Mi − 1)α
2Q∗i1
4ρP ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
4ρP ∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
= − (Mi − 1)α(1 + 2α+Q
∗
i1)
8ρP ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
< 0.
(B.15)
Similarly, we compare the coefficient of ∂Ni0∂β in equation (B.7) with that of
∂Pi0
∂β in equation (B.8).
To do this, we note that
∂2pi
∂N2i0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1)∂
2Pri0
∂N2i0
+ 2Mi
∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂N2i0
=
(
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)[−αQ∗i0(1 + α− (α− 1)Q∗i0)
N2∗i0 (1 +Q∗i0)3
]
− 2Mi
(
αQ∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
)(
αQ∗i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
)
− Mi1 +Q∗i0
(
αQ∗i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
2N∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
)
= − (Mi − 1)α4ρ2P ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)
− α
2MiQ
∗
i1
2ρ2P ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
4ρ2P ∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
= 1
ρ
∂2pi
∂P 2i0
.
(B.16)
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The last equality follows under symmetry and the fact that N∗i0 → ρP ∗i0, N∗i1 → ρP ∗i1 as β → 0. Similarly,
∂2pi
∂Nj0Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1) ∂
2Pri0
∂Nj0∂Ni0
− ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂Prj1
∂Nj0
+Mi
∂Pri0
∂Nj0
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
=
(
Mi
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
α2Q∗i0(1−Q∗i0)
ρ2P ∗i0P
∗
j0(1 +Qi0)3
+
α2Q∗i0Q
∗
j1
ρ2P ∗i0P
∗
j1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
+ α
2Q∗i0Q
∗
i1Mi
ρ2P ∗j0P
∗
i1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
= α
2MiQ
∗
i1
ρ2P ∗i1P
∗
j0(1 +Qi0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
α2Q∗i0Q
∗
j1
ρ2P ∗i0P
∗
j1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
= (Mi + 1)α
2Q∗i1
4ρ2P ∗i1P ∗i0(1 +Qi1)2
= 1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pj0Ni0
.
(B.17)
Therefore, from equations (B.15), (B.16) and (B.17), as β → 0,
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
= − α(Mi − 1)4ρ2P ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)2
−
(
(Mi − 1)α2Q∗i1
4ρ2P ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
+ αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
4ρ2P ∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
)
= − α(Mi − 1)4ρ2P ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)2
+ 1
ρ
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
< 0.
(B.18)
Further, one can show that
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
= 1
ρ2
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
< 0. (B.19)
Step 3. We show that the denominator of the expression in equation (B.9),
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
,
is negative. From equations (B.12), (B.13) and (B.19), this reduces to showing that
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)2
− ρ2
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)2
< 0.
This holds, as equations (B.15) and (B.18) imply that
0 >
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
> ρ
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
.
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Step 4. We show that the numerator of the expression in equation (B.9),
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
− ∂
2pi
∂β∂Pi0
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
,
is positive in equilibrium. From equations (B.12), (B.13) and (B.19), the numerator reduces to
ρ2
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
− ∂
2pi
∂β∂Pi0
(
∂2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
.
Now,
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
= ∂Pri0
∂Pi0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂β
− ∂Prj1
∂β
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂β∂Pi0
= −α
2(Mi − 1)(N∗i0 − P ∗i0)Q∗i1
4Pi0(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1(αρ(N∗i0 − P ∗i0)(1−Q∗i1)−N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1))
2N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3
= ρ
(
−α
2(Mi − 1)(N∗i0 − P ∗i0)Q∗i1
4Ni0(1 +Q∗i1)2
− α
2MiQ
∗
i1(N∗i0 − P ∗i0)(1−Q∗i1)
2N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3
− αQ
∗
i1
2(1 +Q∗i1)2
)
+ αQ
∗
i1(Mi + ρ)
2(1 +Q∗i1)2
= ρ ∂
2pi
∂β∂Ni0
+ αQ
∗
i1(Mi + ρ)
2(1 +Q∗i1)2
.
(B.20)
To see that the numerator is always positive, first note that if ∂2pi∂β∂Pi0 > 0, then the numerator is positive.
If, instead ∂2pi∂β∂Pi0 < 0, then from equations (B.15), (B.18) and (B.20),
0 > ∂
2pi
∂β∂Pi0
> ρ
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
, 0 >
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
> ρ
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
implying that the numerator in equation (B.9) is positive. Since the denominator in equation (B.9)is
negative (step 3), it follows that N∗i0 (and hence n∗i0) is decreasing in β.
To determine the impact of increasing β on p∗i0, we rewrite equation (B.8) below with the signs of
some of the expressions contained in it.
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
+
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
dNi0
dβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
+
(
∂2pi
∂P 2i0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
dPi0
dβ
= 0.
Then, it follows that dPi0dβ > 0 when
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
> 0. Below, we show that ∂2pii∂β∂Pi0 > 0 as long the challengers’
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budgets are not too large.
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
= ∂Pri0
∂Pi0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂β
− ∂Prj1
∂β
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂β∂Pi0
= −α
2(Mi − 1)(N∗i0 − P ∗i0)Q∗i1
4Pi0(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αMiQ
∗
i1(αρ(N∗i0 − P ∗i0)(1−Q∗i1)−N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1))
2N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3
> 0
⇐⇒ −α(Mi − 1)(ρ− 1)2 −
α(Mi − 1)(ρ− 1)(1−Q∗i1)
2Q∗i1
+Mi > 0
⇐⇒ Q∗i1 >
α(Mi − 1)(ρ− 1)
2Mi
,
i.e., if the challengers’ budgets are not too high. The equivalences follow from N∗i0 → ρP ∗i0 as β → 0, rear-
ranging terms and substituting P
∗
i0
P∗
i1
= (Mi−1)(1+Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
from equation (B.5). Also, following the same steps
as above for the case where challengers only campaign negatively in the general election yields the result.
Finally, we show that the increase in positive campaigning exceeds the decrease in negative cam-
paigning so that total campaigning expenditures in the primary election increase. To see this, note that
from equations (B.9) and (B.10) and the assertion in step 3, it follows that
dPi0
dβ
>
∣∣∣∣dNi0dβ
∣∣∣∣⇐⇒ ∂2pi∂β∂Ni0
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
− ∂
2pi
∂β∂Pi0
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
<
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
− ∂
2pi
∂β∂Pi0
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
or,
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
[(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)]
<
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
[(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)]
.
(B.21)
In what follows, we show that this always holds at the equilibrium.To see this, first note that from equation
(B.11) as ρ→ 1,
∂2pi
∂β∂Ni0
→ − αQ
∗
i1
2(1 +Q∗2i1 )
. (B.22)
Therefore, from equations (B.20) and (B.22), as ρ→ 1,
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
→ αMiQ
∗
i1
2(1 +Q∗2i1 )
>
∣∣∣∣ ∂2pi∂β∂Ni0
∣∣∣∣→ αQ∗i12(1 +Q∗2i1 ) . (B.23)
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However, from equations (B.12), (B.13) and (B.18),
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
=
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
= ρ
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
+ α(Mi − 1)4ρP ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)2
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
→ α(Mi − 1)4ρP ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)2
> 0 (when ρ→ 1).
(B.24)
Similarly, from equations (B.14), (B.15), (B.17) and (B.18),
(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
= ρ2
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
−
[
ρ
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂N2i0
)
+ α(Mi − 1)4ρP ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)2
]
→ − α(Mi − 1)4ρP ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)2
< 0 (when ρ→ 1).
(B.25)
Thus, from equations (B.23), (B.24) and (B.25),
∂2pi
∂β∂Pi0
>
∣∣∣∣ ∂2pi∂β∂Ni0
∣∣∣∣ and(
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
=
∣∣∣∣( ∂2pi∂Pj0∂Pi0 + ∂
2pi
∂P 2i0
)
−
(
∂2pi
∂Nj0∂Pi0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)∣∣∣∣
so that the inequality in (B.21) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 7. With symmetry, Q∗i0 = 1, Q∗i1 = Q∗j1. Substituting these expressions and β = 1
into equation (B.3) yields:
MiQ
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
+ 1
)
+ Q
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
= 0.
Canceling terms on both sides, we get
Mi
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
+ 1
)
+ 1 = 0.
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Next, we re-arrange this equality to obtain
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
)
= −Mi + 1
Mi
= −1− 1
Mi
.
Since Mi > 1, it follows that (
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
)
∈ (−2,−1),
and hence (
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
)
< −1. (B.26)
Now, recall from Proposition 4 that p∗i1 = Bi12 − ρ−12ρ and n∗i1 = Bi12 + ρ−12ρ . Therefore,
P ∗i1 = 1 + p∗i1 =
ρ+ 1
2ρ +
Bi1
2 and N
∗
i1 = 1 + ρn∗i1 =
ρ+ 1
2 +
ρBi1
2 , i.e. N
∗
i1 = ρP ∗i1.
Substituting N∗i1 = ρP ∗i1, the inequality in (B.26) simplifies to:
(
N∗i0
ρ
− P ∗i0
)
< −P ∗i1. (B.27)
Further, since P ∗i0 = 1+p∗i0 and N∗i0 = 1+ρn∗i0, it follows that Bi1 = B¯i−(p∗i0+n∗i0) = B¯i−(P ∗i0−1)−N
∗
i0−1
ρ ,
so that
P ∗i1 =
ρ+ 1
2ρ +
Bi1
2 =
1
ρ
(
1 + ρ+ ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
.
Hence, the inequality in (B.27) may be rewritten as
(
N∗i0
ρ
− P ∗i0
)
< −1
ρ
(
1 + ρ+ ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
.
Multiplying both sides by ρ and rearranging the right-hand side slightly yields:
N∗i0 − ρP ∗i0 < 1− ρ−
(
2 + ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
. (B.28)
Now, recall from Proposition 4 that challengers devote resources to both negative and positive campaigning
in the general election when Bi1 = p∗i1 + n∗i1 = B¯i − (p∗i0 + n∗i0) ≥ ρ−1ρ , i.e.
B¯i − (P ∗i0 − 1)−
(
N∗i0 − 1
ρ
)
≥ ρ− 1
ρ
. (B.29)
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Rearranging terms, we rewrite (B.29) as
1 + ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2 ≥ 0. (B.30)
Hence, from (B.28) and (B.30),
N∗i0 − ρP ∗i0 < 1− ρ−
(
2 + ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 from (B.30)
< 1− ρ, i.e., N∗i0 − ρP ∗i0 < 1− ρ.
Substituting N∗i0 = 1 + ρn∗i0 and P ∗i0 = 1 + p∗i0 to this inequality yields
1 + ρn∗i0 − (ρ(1 + p∗i0) < 1− ρ⇔ ρ(n∗i0 − p∗i0) < 0.
Continuity of n∗i0, p∗i0 in β then implies that the result holds for all β sufficiently small. 
Proof of Lemma 1. At an interior optimum, N∗i0, P ∗i0, N∗j0, P ∗j0 satisfy
∂2pi
∂θ∂Ni0︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect of a change in θ
+
indirect effect via change in i’s actions︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2
dNi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
dPi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
dPj0
dθ
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
dNj0
dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect via change in j’s actions
= 0
(B.31)
for θ ∈ X¯I , B¯I , α.
From equation (B.6) it follows that when β = 0, under assumptions of symmetry, dNi0dθ = ρ
dPi0
dθ =
ρ
dPj0
dθ =
dNj0
dθ , at the equilibrium. Therefore, equation (B.31) may be rewritten as
∂2pi
∂θ∂Ni0
+ dNi0
dθ
(
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
)
= 0. (B.32)
Then, if
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
< 0 (B.33)
∂2pi
∂θ∂Ni0
and dNi0dθ have the same sign. Similarly, for changes in B¯i, B¯j , or X¯i, X¯j or Mi,Mj ,
dni0
dθi
+
dni0
dθj
, ∂
2pi
∂θi∂ni0
+ ∂2pi∂θj∂ni0 have the same sign. Thus, the direct effect is reinforced by, or if in the opposite
direction, outweighs the indirect effect, and in what follows, we show that the inequality above indeed
holds at equilibrium under symmetry. To see this, note that from equations (B.13), (B.14), (B.16) and
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(B.17), the left-hand side of (B.33) reduces to
−(Mi − 1)α
4ρ2P ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)
− αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
2ρ2P ∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
− (Mi − 1)α
2Q∗i1
2ρ2P ∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
= α4ρ2(1 +Q∗i1)
(
− (Mi − 1)
P ∗2i0
− 2MiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
P ∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)2
− 2(Mi − 1)αQ
∗
i1
P ∗i0P
∗
i1(1 +Q∗i1)
)
.
(B.34)
Multiplying both numerator and denominator by P ∗2i0 , and substituting
P∗i0
P∗
i1
= (Mi−1)(1+Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
, from equation
(B.5) under symmetry yields
α(Mi − 1)
4ρ2P ∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)
[
−1−
(
1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1
Q∗i1
)
Mi − 1
2Mi
− α(Mi − 1)
Mi
]
. (B.35)
Therefore, (B.33) holds if
− 1−
(
1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1
Q∗i1
)
Mi − 1
2Mi
− α(Mi − 1)
Mi
< 0. (B.36)
Simplifying the inequality in (B.36) yields
Q∗i1 > −
(1 + 2α)(Mi − 1)
3Mi − 1 ,
which always holds as Mi > 1.
Similarly, one can show that when the resources in the general election are low enough that a chal-
lenger only campaigns negatively, the left-hand side of (B.33) reduces to
−(Mi − 1)α
4N∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)
− αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + α− (α− 1)Q∗i1)
N∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
− (Mi − 1)α
2Q∗i1
2N∗i0N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
.
As before, multiplying by N2i0, substituting the first-order conditions and rearranging terms reveals that
(B.33) holds as long as
1 +
(
1 + α− (α− 1)Q∗i1
Q∗i1
)
Mi − 1
Mi
+ α(Mi − 1)
Mi
> 0,
or,
Q∗i1 > −
(1 + α)(Mi − 1)
2Mi − 1 ,
which always holds in equilibrium. 
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Proof of Proposition 8. From Lemma 1, we only need to focus on the partial derivative capturing the
direct effect of a change in a parameter. Thus, N∗i0 increases in the challengers’ reputations X¯i, X¯j if and
only if ∂2pi
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂2pi
∂X¯j∂Ni0
> 0. We show that this holds in equilibrium:
∂2pi
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂X¯j∂Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1)
(
∂2Pri0
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂
2Pri0
∂X¯j∂Ni0
)
+
∂Pri0
∂Ni0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂X¯i
− ∂Prj1
∂X¯j
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+Mi
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
(
∂Pri0
∂X¯i
+ ∂Pri0
∂X¯j
)
.
Now, under symmetry, ∂Pri0
∂X¯i
+ ∂Pri0
∂X¯j
= Q
∗
i0
X¯i(1+Q∗i0)2
− Q∗i0
X¯j(1+Q∗i0)2
= 0 and since Q∗i0 = 1, it follows that
∂2Pri0
∂X¯i∂Ni0
= − αQ∗i0(1−Q∗i0)
X¯iN∗i0(1+Q∗i0)3
= 0. Therefore,
∂2pi
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂X¯j∂Ni0
= ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂X¯i
− ∂Prj1
∂X¯j
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂X¯i∂Ni0
= αQ
∗
i1
2(1 +Q∗i1)2X¯i
(
Mi − 1
2N∗i0
+ Mi(1−Q
∗
i1)
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)
)
.
Multiplying both numerator and denominator by N∗i0 and substituting
N∗i0
N∗
i1
= (Mi−1)(1+Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
from the
first-order conditions yields
∂2pi
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂X¯j∂Ni0
= α(Mi − 1)
4N∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2X¯i
> 0. (B.37)
Therefore, N∗i0, P ∗i0 and hence, total campaigning expenditures in the primary rise with the challenger’s
reputation.
The probability of winning the primary is always half in a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, the
probability of being elected to office only varies with a change in a candidate’s chances against the incum-
bent in the general election. Since Pr∗i1 = 11+Q∗
i1
, it suffices to derive the impact on Q∗i1. Since increasing
X¯i reduces campaigning in the general election, N∗i1, P ∗i1, the net impact on the probability that candidate
i wins the general election depends on the relative change in X¯i and N∗i1, P ∗i1. We now show that the direct
effect (improvement in reputation) dominates the indirect effect (decrease in campaigning expenditures
in the general election), implying that the probability of ousting the incumbent rises. To see this, recall
that Q∗i1 =
X¯I(P∗I N
∗
I )
α
X¯i(P∗i1N∗i1)α
= X¯I(N
∗
I )
2α
X¯i(N∗i1)2α
, so that
(
dQi1
dX¯i
+ dQi1
dX¯j
)
< 0⇐⇒ 1 + 2αX¯i
Ni1
(
dNi1
dX¯i
+ dNi1
dX¯j
)
> 0⇐⇒ 1− 2αX¯i
Ni1
(
dNi0
dX¯i
+ dNi0
dX¯j
)
> 0. (B.38)
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The last equivalence in (B.38) follows from
N∗i1 = 1 + ρn∗i1 =
ρ+ 1
2 +
ρBi1
2 = 1 + ρ+
ρB¯i
2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2 = 1 + ρ+
ρB¯i
2 −Ni0 (since N
∗
i0 = ρP ∗i0).
Now, from equation (B.32),
dNi0
dX¯i
+ dNi0
dX¯j
= −
∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂2pii
∂X¯j∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂Ni02
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pii∂Nj0∂Ni0
.
From equations (B.35) and (B.37), the right-hand side may be written as
α(Mi−1)
4N∗
i0X¯i(1+Q∗i1)2
α(Mi−1)
4ρ2P∗2
i0 (1+Q∗i1)
[
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
]
=
N∗i0
X¯i(1+Q∗i1)[
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
] , since N∗i0 = ρP ∗i0.
One can show that the last inequality in (B.38) holds by rearranging terms and substituting for N
∗
i0
N∗
i1
=
(Mi−1)(1+Q∗i1)
2MiQ∗i1
. Note that these results extend to the case where a challenger only campaigns negatively
in the general election:
dQi1
dX¯i
+ dQi1
dX¯j
=
(
d
dX¯i
+ d
dX¯j
)(
X¯INI2α
X¯i(ρNi1)α
)
< 0⇐⇒ dNi1
dX¯i
+ dNi1
dX¯j
= −2
(
dNi0
dX¯i
+ dNi0
dX¯j
)
> − Ni1
αX¯i
,
since
N∗i1 = 1 + ρBi1 = 2 + ρ+ ρB¯i − ρP ∗i0 −N∗i0 = 2 + ρ+ ρB¯i − 2N∗i0.
Now,
(
dNi0
dX¯i
+ dNi0
dX¯j
)
=
α(Mi−1)
4N∗
i0(1+Q∗i1)2X¯i
α(Mi−1)
4ρ2P∗2
i0 (1+Q∗i1)
[
1 +
(
1+α−(α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
Mi
+ α(Mi−1)Mi
]
=
N∗i0
X¯I(1+Q∗i1)[
1 +
(
1+α−(α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
Mi
+ α(Mi−1)Mi
]
Rearranging terms and substituting for N
∗
i0
N∗
i1
from the first order conditions yields the result.
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Similarly, consider the impact of increasing the challengers’ budgets. Under symmetry,
∂2pi
∂B¯i∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂B¯j∂Ni0
= ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂B¯i
− ∂Prj1
∂B¯j
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂B¯i∂Ni0
= αQ
∗
i1
4P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
[
α(Mi − 1)
N∗i0
+ Mi
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)
(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
]
= α(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q
∗
i1)
8N∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
> 0
(B.39)
at equilibrium.
Again, since P ∗i0 =
N∗i0
ρ , increases in the challengers’ budgets raise P ∗i0. Thus, N∗i0, P ∗i0 and total
primary campaigning expenditure rise with the challengers’ budgets and reputations.
We next argue that increasing the challengers’ budgets also increases P ∗i1, N∗i1 (and hence the probabil-
ity of winning the general election), i.e., the increase in primary campaigning expenditures does not entirely
exhaust the increase in the challengers’ budgets. This follows if and only if dNi0
dB¯i
+ dNi0
dB¯j
< ρ2 as N∗i1 = 1+ρ+
ρB¯i
2 −Ni0. As before, one can show that given equations (B.32), (B.35) and (B.39), this always holds in equi-
librium. This result also carries over to when a challenger only campaigns negatively in the general election.
Lastly, consider the effect of an increase in Mi, which captures the relative payoffs for candidate i
from being elected to office.
∂2pii
∂Mi∂Ni0
= Pri0
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
+ Pri1
∂Pri0
∂Ni0
= α(1 +Q∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)
(
Q∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
− Q
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)
)
= αQ
∗
i0
MiN∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗j1)
> 0 (from equation (4)).
Thus, N∗i0 is increasing in Mi. Since Mi = UiVi > 1, it follows that an increasing Ui increases negative
campaigning in the primary election, while increasing Vi, leads to a decrease in N∗i0. It also follows that
equal changes in Ui, Vi lower Mi and hence N∗i0. Since, P ∗i0 =
N∗i0
ρ , the same results apply to P ∗i0, too.
Again, via the budget constraint, P ∗i1, N∗i1 are decreasing in Mi. Consequently, the chances of winning the
general election decrease in Mi. As above, this also holds when challengers only campaign negatively in
the general election.
Note that changes in n∗i0, p∗i0 mirror changes in N∗i0, P ∗i0. Finally, the continuity of the derivatives in
β, implies that there exists a β¯ such that the results hold for all β ∈ [0, β¯). 
Proof of Proposition 9. From the continuity of the derivatives in X¯i, B¯i,Mi, it suffices to prove the result
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when challengers are symmetric. Further, from Lemma 1, we only need to focus on the partial derivative
capturing the direct effect of a change in a parameter on N∗i0. Consider the impact of increasing α.
∂2pii
∂α∂Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1) ∂
2Pri0
∂α∂Ni0
+ ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂α
− ∂Prj1
∂α
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂α∂Ni0
+Mi
∂Pri0
∂α
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1)
Q∗i0
(
1− ln
(
X¯j
X¯iQ∗i0
)
+
(
1 + ln
(
X¯j
X¯iQ∗i0
))
Q∗i0
)
N∗i0(1 +Qi0)3

+ Q
∗
i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
MiQ∗i1 ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
(1 +Q∗i1)2
−
Q∗j1 ln
(
X¯I
X¯jQ∗j1
)
(1 +Q∗j1)2
− MiQ∗i0Q∗i1 ln
(
X¯j
X¯iQ∗i0
)
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
+ MiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3(1 +Q∗i0)
[
−1 + ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
−
(
1 + ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
))
Q∗i1
]
= MiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
1− ln
(
X¯j
X¯iQ∗i0
)
+Q∗i0
)
+ Q
∗
i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
MiQ∗i1 ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
(1 +Q∗i1)2
−
Q∗j1 ln
(
X¯I
X¯jQ∗j1
)
(1 +Q∗j1)2

+ MiQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3(1 +Q∗i0)
[
−1 + ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
−
(
1 + ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
))
Q∗i1
]
=
MiQ
∗
i1 ln
(
X¯iQ
∗
i0
X¯j
)
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
(
Mi − (1−Q
∗2
i1 )
1+Qj1
)
Q∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
+
Q∗i0Q
∗
j1
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
ln
(
X¯jQ
∗
j1
X¯I
)
= Mi − (1−Q
∗
i1)
4N∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2
ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
− Q
∗
i1
4N∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2
ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
(when Q∗i0 = 1, Q∗i1 = Q∗j1)
= Mi − 14N∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2
ln
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
T 0,
(B.40)
according to whether
(
X¯I
X¯iQ∗i1
)
=
(
N∗i1
NI
)2α
T 1, i.e., according to whether B¯i T B¯∗i . The impact of raising
the sensitivity of reputations to campaigning on the probability of winning the general election similarly
depends on the challengers’ budgets. To see this, note that
dQi1
dα
T 0⇐⇒ −dNi0
dα
= dNi1
dα
Q N
∗
i1
α
ln
(
N∗I
N∗i1
)
.
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From equations (B.32), (B.35) and (B.40),
−dNi0
dα
=
2α(Mi−1)
4N∗
i0(1+Q∗i1)2
ln
(
N∗I
N∗
i1
)
α(Mi−1)
4ρ2P∗2
i0 (1+Q∗i1)
[
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
]
=
2N∗i0
(1+Q∗
i1)
ln
(
N∗I
N∗
i1
)
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
.
As before, by rearranging terms and substituting for N
∗
i0
N∗
i1
= (Mi−1)(1+Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
, one can show that if ln
(
N∗I
N∗
i1
)
T
0, i.e. if
(
N∗I
N∗
i1
)
T 1, so that N∗i0 is decreasing, invariant or increasing in α respectively, then dQi1dα T 0;
that is, the chances of winning the general election are decreasing, invariant or increasing in α, respec-
tively. Thus, when B¯i < B¯∗i , i.e., when the challengers’ budgets are relatively low, their campaigning
expenditures in the general election are relatively low, so that increasing α causes them to reduce negative
primary campaigning N∗i0 and to increase N∗i1, but this is insufficient to offset the incumbent’s increased
advantage from his greater budget due to the heightened sensitivity of reputations to campaigning—so
that the challenger is less likely to win the general election. The reverse holds when challengers’ budgets
are high. When B¯i = B¯∗i , an increase in α has no impact on campaign levels or the probability of a win
for the challengers. One can show that these results carry over to when the challenger’s campaign in the
general election is exclusively negative.
Next, consider the impact of improving the incumbent’s reputation. Note that N∗i0 decreases in X¯I
if and only if ∂2pi
∂X¯I∂Ni0
< 0, which holds in equilibrium:
∂2pii
∂X¯I∂Ni0
= ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂
∂X¯I
(MiPri1 − Prj1) +MiPri0 ∂
2Pri1
∂X¯I∂Ni0
= αQ
∗
i0
Ni0(1 +Q∗i0)2
(
Q∗j1(1 +Q∗i1)2 −Q∗i1(1 +Q∗j1)2Mi
X¯I(1 +Q∗i1)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
− αQ
∗
i1(1−Q∗i1)Mi
X¯IN∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)3
= αQ
∗
i0
X¯I(1 +Q∗i0)2N∗i0
(
Q∗j1
(1 +Q∗j1)2
− Mi(1 +Q∗11)2
+ 1−Q
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)(1 +Q∗j1)
)
= αQ
∗
i0
X¯I(1 +Q∗i0)2N∗i0
(
−(Mi − 1)(2Q∗j1 + 1) + 2Q∗i1Q∗j1 −MiQ∗2j1 −Q∗2i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
< 0.
(B.41)
Similarly, it is easy to show that negative campaigning in the primary falls with the incumbent’s
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budget, B¯I :
∂2pii
∂B¯I∂Ni0
= ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
(
Mi
∂Pri1
∂B¯I
− ∂Prj1
∂B¯I
)
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂B¯I∂Ni0
= αQ
∗
i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
(
−αMiQ∗i1
P ∗I (1 +Q∗i1)2
+
αQ∗j1
P ∗I (1 +Q∗j1)2
)
− α
2MiQ
∗
i1(1−Q∗i1)
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)N∗I (1 +Q∗i1)3
= α
2
ρP ∗I (1 +Q∗i0)
[
Q∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
(
−MiQ∗i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
Q∗j1
(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
− MiQ
∗
i1(1−Q∗i1)
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3
]
= α
2Q∗i0
ρP ∗I P
∗
i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
(
−MiQ∗i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
Q∗j1
(1 +Q∗j1)2
− (MiPr
∗
i1 − Pr∗j1)(1−Q∗i1)
(1 +Q∗i1)
)
= −α
2Q∗i0
(
(Mi − 1)(1 +Q∗j1)2 + (Q∗i1 −Q∗j1)2
)
ρP ∗I P
∗
i0(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
< 0.
(B.42)
The fourth equality follows from equation (B.5). Since P ∗i0 =
N∗i0
ρ , it follows thatP ∗i0 decreases in X¯I , B¯I
too. Then, total primary campaigning expenditures fall with the incumbent’s budget and reputation, too.
Further, since P ∗i1, N∗i1 decrease in N∗i0, P ∗i0, they rise with X¯I , B¯I , implying that challengers now spend
more on campaigning in the general election than before.
Thus, improving the incumbent’s reputation induces challengers to campaign more extensively in the
general election. However, the probability that a challenger wins the general election still falls with X¯I ,
i.e., the direct effect dominates the indirect strategic effect on challengers campaigning in the primary.
The incumbent’s campaigning levels depend on his budget alone, so
dQi1
dX¯I
= d
dX¯I
(
X¯IN
2α
I
X¯iN∗2αi1
)
> 0⇐⇒ dNi1
dX¯I
= −dNi0
dX¯I
<
Ni1
2αX¯I
⇐⇒
dNi1
Ni1
dX¯I
X¯I
<
1
2α. (B.43)
Intuitively, increasing both X¯I and N∗i1 have opposing effects on Q∗i1, so that the relative strength of the
two effects decides the net impact on the probability that the challenger wins the general election. Now,
from equation (B.41), substituting the symmetry conditions, Q∗i0 = 1, Q∗i1 = Q∗j1, yields
dNi0
dX¯I
= α(Mi − 1)
4ρP ∗i0X¯I(1 +Q∗i1)2
(B.44)
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Therefore, from equations (B.32), (B.35) and (B.44),
−dNi0
dX¯I
=
∂2pii
∂X¯I∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂Ni02
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pii∂Nj0∂Ni0
=
α(Mi−1)
4ρP∗
i0X¯I(1+Q∗i1)2
α(Mi−1)
4ρ2P∗2
i0 (1+Q∗i1)
[
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
]
=
N∗i0
X¯I(1+Q∗i1)[
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
] .
One can show that the inequality in (B.43) holds by rearranging terms and substituting N
∗
i0
N∗
i1
= (Mi−1)(1+Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
.
Similarly, one can show that increasing the incumbent’s budget reduces a challenger’s chances of
winning the general election. This holds if -dNi0
dB¯I
< ρNi12NI1 and one can show that this holds the equilibrium,
given equations (B.32), (B.35) and (B.42). These results extend to when a challenger only campaigns
negatively in the general election.
Finally, note that for a given ρ, an increase (decrease) in N∗it, P ∗it, t ∈ {0, 1}, implies an increase
(decrease) in n∗it, p∗it. Again, by the continuity of the derivatives in β and other parameters, there exists
a β¯ such that these results hold for all β ∈ [0, β¯) in the neighborhood of symmetry. 
Proof of Proposition 11.
At the equilibrium (N∗i0, P ∗i0, N∗j0, P ∗j0),
∂2pii
∂θ∂Ni0︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect of a change in θ
+
indirect effect via change in i’s actions︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2pii
∂Ni0
2
dNi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
dPi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
dPj0
dθ
+ ∂
2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
dNj0
dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect via change in j’s actions
= 0
and
∂2pij
∂θ∂Nj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect of a change in θ
+
indirect effect via change in i’s actions︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
dNi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
dPi0
dθ
+ ∂
2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
dPj0
dθ
+ ∂
2pij
∂N2j0
dNj0
dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect via change in j’s actions
= 0.
Since ρP ∗i0 = N∗i0 and ρP ∗j0 = N∗j0 at an interior optimum when β = 0 (from equation (B.6)), the
equations reduce to,
∂2pii
∂θ∂Ni0
+
(
∂2pii
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
dNi0
dθ
+
(
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
dNj0
dθ
= 0
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and
∂2pij
∂θ∂Nj0
+
(
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
)
dNi0
dθ
+
(
∂2pij
∂N2j0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
)
dNj0
dθ
= 0.
Next, solve these equations for
dNi0
dθ
=
∂2pii
∂θ∂Ni0
(
∂2pij
∂N2
j0
+ 1ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
)
− ∂2pij∂θ∂Nj0
(
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
(
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1ρ
∂2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
)(
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pii
∂Ni02
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)(
∂2pij
∂N2
j0
+ 1ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
)
(B.45)
and similarly for dNj0dθ . It follows from the second-order conditions and equation (B.16) (which holds in
the neighborhood of symmetry from the continuity of the derivatives in X¯i, B¯i,Mi, etc.) that
∂2pii
∂N2i0
∂2pii
∂P 2i0
−
(
∂2pii
∂Ni0∂Pi0
)2
→
(
ρ
∂2pii
∂N2i0
)2
−
(
∂2pii
∂Ni0∂Pi0
)2
> 0⇒ ∂
2pii
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
< 0. (B.46)
Also, recall from equation (B.17) that
∂2pii
∂Nj0Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0Ni0
> 0. (B.47)
Further, given the continuity of derivatives in the parameters, it follows from Lemma 1 that in the neigh-
borhood of symmetry,
∂2pi
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pi
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂
2pi
∂Nj0∂Ni0
< 0. (B.48)
Then, from equations (B.47) and (B.48) it follows that
0 < ∂
2pii
∂Nj0Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0Ni0
<
∣∣∣∣ ∂2pii∂Ni02 + 1ρ ∂
2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
∣∣∣∣
Analogous inequalities hold for challenger j, implying that the denominator of the expression on the right-
hand side in equation (B.45) is negative. Below, we reproduce equation (B.45) along with the signs of
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expressions contained in it:
dNi0
dθ
=
∂2pii
∂θ∂Ni0
< 0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∂2pij
∂N2j0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
)
− ∂2pij∂θ∂Nj0
> 0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
(
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
)(
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pii
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)(
∂2pij
∂N2j0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
.
(B.49)
Similarly,
dNj0
dθ
=
∂2pij
∂θ∂Nj0
< 0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∂2pii
∂N2i0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)
− ∂2pii∂θ∂Ni0
> 0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
)
(
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
)(
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
−
(
∂2pii
∂Ni0
2 +
1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
)(
∂2pij
∂N2j0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
.
(B.50)
Now, consider the impact of improving only challenger i’s reputation. We first show that as long as
a challenger’s payoff from winning office significantly exceeds his payoff if his primary rival wins, so that
Mi > 3, then ∂
2pij
∂X¯i∂Nj0
> 0. To show this, we first note that,
pij = −(MjPrj1 − Pri1)Pri0 +MjPrj1
so that,
∂2pij
∂X¯i∂Nj0
= − ∂
2Pri0
∂X¯i∂Nj0
(MjPrj1 − Pri1)−Mj ∂Prj1
∂Nj0
∂Pri0
∂X¯i
+ ∂Pri0
∂Nj0
∂Pri1
∂X¯i
= (MjPrj1 − Pri1) αQ
∗
i0(1−Q∗i0)
X¯iN∗j0(1 +Q∗i0)3
− αQ
∗
i0Q
∗
i1
X¯iN∗j0(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
αMjQ
∗
i0Q
∗
j1
X¯iN∗j1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗j1)2
→ αQ
∗
i1(MiN∗i0 −N∗i1)
4X¯iN∗i0N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
(as Q∗i0 = 1, Q∗i1 = Q∗j1)
= α(Mi − 1 + (Mi − 3)Q
∗
i1)
8X¯iN∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2
> 0,
(B.51)
when Mi ≥ 3. Recall that N∗i0 increases in Mi. Therefore, N∗i1 decreases in Mi, so that MiN∗i0 −N∗i1 > 0
when Mi is high. In fact, the last equality in (B.51), which is obtained by dividing both numerator and
denominator by N∗i1 and substituting
N∗i0
N∗
i1
= (Mi−1)(1+Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
, indicates that Mi > 3 suffices, and in what
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follows, we assume that this holds. Similarly,
∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
= ∂
2Pri0
∂X¯i∂Ni0
(MiPri1 − Prj1) +Mi ∂Pri1
∂Ni0
∂Pri0
∂X¯i
+Mi
∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂Pri1
∂X¯i
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂X¯i∂Ni0
= (MiPri1 − Prj1) αQ
∗
i0(1−Q∗i0)
X¯iN∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)3
+ αMiQ
∗
i0Q
∗
i1
X¯iN∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
+ αMiQ
∗
i1(1−Q∗i1)
X¯iN∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)3
− αMiQ
∗
i1Q
∗
i0
X¯iN∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
→ αMiQ
∗
i1
4X¯iN∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2
+ αMiQ
∗
i1(1−Q∗i1)
2X¯iN∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)3
− αMiQ
∗
i1
4X¯iN∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
=
α(Mi − 3)(Mi−1Mi−3 −Q∗i1)
8X¯iN∗i0(1 +Q∗i1)2
.
(B.52)
Now, note that Mi−1Mi−3 decreases in Mi, while Q
∗
i1 increases in Mi (when Mi increases, N∗i0, P ∗i0 increase and
N∗i1, P
∗
i1 decrease implying Q∗i1 increases). Therefore, when Mi is high, Mi−1Mi−3 −Q∗i1 is low. If it is positive,
i.e. if Q∗i1 < Mi−1Mi−3 , then so is
∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
, and from equations (B.49) and (B.50), dNi0
dX¯i
> 0, dNj0
dX¯i
> 0. If it is
negative, i.e., if Q∗i1 > Mi−1Mi−3 , so that
∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
< 0, then dNj0
dX¯i
> 0, since from equations (B.51) and (B.52),
∂2pij
∂X¯i∂Nj0
>
∣∣∣∣ ∂2pii∂X¯i∂Ni0
∣∣∣∣
while, as β → 0,
(
∂2pij
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pi0∂Nj0
)
=
(
∂2pii
∂Ni0∂Nj0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
)
<
∣∣∣∣ ∂2pii∂N2i0 + 1ρ ∂
2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
∣∣∣∣
from Lemma 1. Hence, the numerator of expression (B.50) is still negative. Thus, challenger j always raises
his campaigning levels in response to an improvement in the reputation of the other challenger. However,
the analysis of the direction of change in N∗i0 is not so straightforward anymore. From equation (B.49),
dNi0
dX¯i
≷ 0⇐⇒
∂2pij
∂N2
j0
+ 1ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
≷
∂2pij
∂X¯i∂Nj0
∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
.
Adding one to both sides and substituting
∂2pij
∂N2j0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pij
∂Pj0∂Nj0
= ∂
2pii
∂N2i0
+ 1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
,
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which holds as β → 0, yields
∂2pii
∂N2
i0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pii∂Nj0∂Ni0 +
1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
≷
∂2pij
∂X¯i∂Nj0
+ ∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂X¯i∂Ni0
(B.53)
From Lemma 1, as β → 0, the expression on the left-hand side of (B.53) goes to
α(Mi−1)
4ρ2P∗2
i0 (1+Q∗i1)
[
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
]
(Mi+1)α2Q∗i1
2ρ2P∗
i1P
∗
i0(1+Qi1)2
.
Rearranging terms and substituting P
∗
i0
P∗
i1
→ (Mi−1)(1+Q∗i1)2MiQ∗i1 , this reduces to
Mi
α(Mi + 1)
[
−1−
(
1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1
Q∗i1
)
Mi − 1
2Mi
− α(Mi − 1)
Mi
]
. (B.54)
From equations (B.51) and (B.52), after canceling terms, the right-hand side of (B.53) is
2(Mi−1)
Mi−3
Mi−1
Mi−3−Q
∗
i1
. Thus,
when Q∗i1 > Mi−1Mi−3 ,
dNi0
dX¯i
≷ 0⇐⇒ Mi
α(Mi + 1)
[
−1−
(
1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1
Q∗i1
)
Mi − 1
2Mi
− α(Mi − 1)
Mi
]
≷
2(Mi−1)
Mi−3
Mi−1
Mi−3 −Q∗i1
or,
dNi0
dX¯i
≷ 0⇐⇒ (1 + 2α)(Mi − 1) +Q
∗
i1(3Mi − 1)
2αQ∗i1(Mi + 1)
+ 2(Mi − 1)
Mi − 1− (Mi − 3)Q∗i1
≶ 0
⇐⇒
(
(1 + 2α)(Mi − 1) +Q∗i1(3Mi − 1)
)(
Mi − 1− (Mi − 3)Q∗i1
)
+ 4(M2i − 1)αQ∗i1 ≷ 0.
(B.55)
It is easy to see that there exists a Q¯, such that for Q∗i1 ∈ (Mi−1Mi−3 , Q¯), the above expression is positive imply-
ing that negative primary campaigning by i increases in X¯i, and from the analysis above, it is increasing for
Q∗i1 <
Mi−1
Mi−3 as well. Thus, if the incumbent is weak so that he is likely to be ousted by a challenger (either
due to a poor reputation or a low budget), i.e., Q∗i1 ∈ (0, Q¯), then the challenger’s primary campaigning
levels increase as his reputation improves, while the opposite holds if the incumbent is strong.
Next, consider the impact of increasing challenger i’s budget. We first show that it results in in-
creased negative campaigning by both challengers in the primary when challengers have nearly identical
endowments, preferences and reputations. To see this, first note that when β = 0,
∂2pij
∂B¯i∂Nj0
= ∂Pri0
∂Nj0
∂Pri1
∂B¯i
= −αQ
∗
i0
N∗j0(1 +Q∗i0)2
αQ∗i1
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
→ −α
2Q∗i1
4N∗i0P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
< 0, (B.56)
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and
∂2pii
∂B¯i∂Ni0
= Mi
∂Pri0
∂Ni0
∂Pri1
∂B¯i
+MiPri0
∂2Pri1
∂B¯i∂Ni0
= α
2MiQ
∗
i0Q
∗
i1
N∗i0P
∗
i1(1 +Q∗i0)2(1 +Q∗i1)2
+ αMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
2N∗i1P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)3
= α
2ρMiQ
∗
i1
4N∗i0N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
+ αρMiQ
∗
i1(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1)
4N∗2i1 (1 +Q∗i1)3
= αρ(Mi − 1)8N∗2i0 (1 +Q∗i1)
(
α+ (Mi − 1)(1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q
∗
i1)
2MiQ∗i1
)
= αρ(Mi − 1)((Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q
∗
i1) + 2αQ∗i1)
16N∗2i0 MiQ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)
> 0.
(B.57)
Then, it follows from equation (B.49) that as β → 0,
dNi0
d¯¯Bi
> 0⇐⇒
∂2pii
∂N2
i0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
<
∂2pij
∂B¯i∂Nj0
∂2pii
∂B¯i∂Ni0
⇐⇒
∂2pii
∂N2
i0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pii∂Nj0∂Ni0 +
1
ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
<
∂2pij
∂B¯i∂Nj0
+ ∂2pii
∂B¯i∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂B¯i∂Ni0
.
From equations (B.54), (B.56) and (B.57), and substituting for N
∗
i0
N∗
i1
→ (Mi−1)(1+Q∗i1)2MiQ∗i1 , this may be rewritten
as
Mi
α(Mi + 1)
[
−1−
(
1 + 2α− (2α− 1)Q∗i1
Q∗i1
)
Mi − 1
2Mi
− α(Mi − 1)
Mi
]
<
(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q∗i1)
(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q∗i1) + 2αQ∗i1
or,− (1 + 2α)(Mi − 1) +Q
∗
i1(3Mi − 1)
2αQ∗i1(Mi + 1)
− (Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q
∗
i1)
(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q∗i1) + 2αQ∗i1
< 0,
which always holds as Mi > 1. Similarly,
dNj0
d¯¯Bi
> 0⇐⇒
∂2pii
∂Nj0∂Ni0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pj0∂Ni0
+ ∂2pii
∂N2
i0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂N2
i0
+ 1ρ
∂2pii
∂Pi0∂Ni0
<
∂2pij
∂B¯i∂Nj0
+ ∂2pii
∂B¯i∂Ni0
∂2pii
∂B¯i∂Ni0
or,
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi +
α(Mi−1)
Mi
1 +
(
1+2α−(2α−1)Q∗
i1
Q∗
i1
)
Mi−1
2Mi + 2α
<
(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q∗i1)
(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α+Q∗i1) + 2αQ∗i1
⇐⇒Mi(Mi − 1)(1 + 2α) +MiQ∗i1(Mi − 3) > 0
which always holds. Thus, negative primary campaigning by challengers initially increases with challenger
i’s budget in the neighborhood of symmetry.
Finally, consider the impact of an increase in the relative payoff, Mi, of challenger i. Note that
∂2pij
∂Mi∂Nj0
= 0, while ∂2pii∂Mi∂Ni0 > 0, as shown earlier. Then, from equation (B.49) and (B.50) it follows that
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∂Ni0
∂Mi
> 0, ∂Nj0∂Mi > 0. Since ρP
∗
i0 = N∗i0, ρP ∗j0 = N∗j0, positive campaigning levels increase as well. Thus, the
challengers’ campaigning levels and expenditure in the primary increase. Note that the probability of a
win for either challenger in the general election declines.
By the continuity of derivatives in β, there exists a β˜ such that for all β ≤ β˜ the result holds. Lastly,
it is easy to show that these results carry over to the case where the challenger campaigns only negatively
in the general election. 
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